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 Abstract 
 
As developing countries seek to improve their economic prospects, electricity reform has 
been widely viewed as a central part of this effort. While the focus of most research to date 
has been at economy or utility level, there has been much less research on regional outcomes. 
India presents a unique case, as its states share a common economic and political system, 
whilst having been given considerable flexibility in how they implement reform, thus 
allowing a comparative analysis of alternative approaches. This study contributes through an 
econometric analysis of the determinants and impact of electricity reform in India, giving 
special regard to its political economy and regional diversity. It assesses how electricity 
reform in India has affected key economic variables that determine sectoral efficiency, prices 
and investment flows. We use panel data for 19 states, spanning 1991-2007, using dynamic 
panel data estimators. Results show that individual reform measures have affected key 
economic variables differently; thus the nature of reform in individual states would determine 
these economic outcomes. Findings suggest that due to political economy factors influencing 
reform, outcomes have tended to be adverse in the initial stages, as previously hidden 
distortions become apparent. The performance of reforms, however, may improve as it 
progresses beyond a ‘baseline’ level. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past few decades, as developing economies have struggled to pull their 
populations out of poverty, electricity sector restructuring has been regarded as a crucial 
facilitating factor for higher levels of economic development (Estache, 2004). The design, 
implementation, and performance of such restructuring has been widely discussed in the 
literature on infrastructure reform (Laffont, 2005; Vickerman, 2004; Harris, 2003; Demurger, 
2001; Gray, 2001; Newbery, 1999; Littlechild, 1999; Galal et al, 1994; Vickers and Yarrow, 
1991). Electricity reforms, initially undertaken in parallel with ‘Structural Adjustment 
Programmes’, are still evolving, and have been moulded to reflect the complex economic and 
political dynamics of developing countries (Jamison et al, 2004).  
 
In India, reform has been riddled with inconsistencies, yet, progressive to an extent, in the 
sense that policy has kept it moving forward. Its most distinctive aspect has been the struggle 
to achieve a framework that removes the sector from political influence. Decades of 
electricity provision by state-owned enterprises created a web of interlocking distortions, 
triggered by the manipulation of the sector as a tool for obtaining political leverage, as early 
as 1977 (Tongia, 2003). Since then, electricity has often been offered by incumbent 
governments, at unsustainably low or zero prices, to farmers who form the bulk of the 
electorate. Considerable amounts of literature exist, documenting and tracing the development 
of these economic distortions in electricity provision brought about by the political economy 
of the sector in India (Victor & Heller, 2007; Chattopadhyay, 2004; Dossani, 2004, Dubash & 
Rajan, 2002; Tongia, 2003; Kalirajan et al, 1998).  Despite the subsequent wastages created, 
this policy continued, for a long time, to be sustained through cross-subsidies from industry4. 
Consequently, average prices began varying inversely with average costs, ultimately leading 
to large deficits and inadequate capital for reinvestment, miring the sector in technical and 
financial problems, at the time of initial reforms in 1991. 
 
Electricity reform in India can be classed in three phases:  generation reform5 following the 
1991 liberalisation, which largely failed; state-led initiatives in the mid-90s which resulted in 
mixed outcomes; and, distribution reform, involving the consolidation of previous legislation 
and mandatory reform procedure, detailed in Electricity Act 2003 (Tongia, 2003). The 
elements of reform in Indian states have tended to follow a generic reform model (Jamasb, 
2006; Besant-Jones, 2006; Jamasb et al, 2004; Newbery, 1995) involving the implementation 
of independent regulation, restructuring, and privatisation of competitive functions, conducted 
in sequence. Thus, the true reform phase can be said to have lasted from 1998-2003 and 
beyond, as 1998 marked legislation instituting independent regulation at the state level. Since 
then, a slew of measures have been mandated through Electricity Act 2003; these include (i) 
the establishment of state independent regulatory commissions (ii) unbundling and 
corporatisation of state-owned enterprises into companies for generation, transmission and 
distribution (iii) tariff rationalisation (removal of cross-subsidies and rebalancing prices) (iv) 
open access to transmission and distribution networks for third-party use (v) private 
participation in distribution. Additionally, the prevalence of Independent Power Producers 
(IPPs) in generation supplements these measures. The combination of all the above is meant 
to lead to a more competitive and efficient form of electricity provision, where prices equate 
or move closer to costs. Most Indian states have independent regulators, but differ on the 
extent of reform implementation6.  
 
                                                 
4 Industry was charged higher prices in efforts to make up for the losses suffered through subsidising farmers. 
5 Independent Power Producers entering into supply contracts with state governments. 
6 Appendix III shows the position of states relative to each other, on electricity reform.  
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
2 
 
This study analyses the determinants and impact of electricity reform in Indian states using 
the econometric investigation of panel data, whilst accounting for the influence of political 
economy factors. India presents a unique opportunity for an empirical study, as its 29 states7 
share a common economic and political system, whilst having considerable flexibility in 
implementing electricity reforms8. This allows the comparative analysis of reforms, whilst 
overcoming obstacles faced in cross-country comparisons, such as cost conversions, inflation, 
and data compatibility. The next section assesses the gap in empirical literature. Section 3 
discusses methodology and data; Section 4 contains results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Gap in Literature 
Although existing empirical literature on electricity reform includes a plethora of 
analytical methods to fulfil varying research objectives, it has focused on cross-country 
assessments of macro-level impacts, and does not contain substantial work in a comparative 
spatial form. Further, existing literature primarily focuses on developed economies, whereas 
developing economies are subject to country-specific factors, resulting in counterintuitive 
outcomes (Victor, 2004; Jamasb et al, 2004). We restrict ourselves to mentioning those 
studies most relevant to the aims and methods employed in this analysis. Thus, there have 
been some notable assessments of the extent and magnitude of reform; in particular, Bacon 
(1999) and Bacon and Besant-Jones, (2002) use ‘scorecards’ for this. Another relevant 
category includes econometric and other quantitative techniques assessing the determinants 
and outcomes of reforms; Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2002) identify the effects of reform 
in developing countries by testing whether the switch to private provision leads to better 
efficiency and price outcomes (Jamasb at al, 2004). The institutional environment in the 
electricity sector9 has also been studied empirically; Victor (2004) investigates the causes, 
pace and outcomes of the electricity reform in Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, 
and finds parallels between reforms in different sectors in creating an environment conducive 
to investment. Related studies examine the impact of reforms on attracting private investment, 
which in turn is positively correlated with defined property rights (Jamasb et al, 2004). 
‘Efficiency’ analyses present a mixed picture of success, as the distribution of any efficiency 
gains is contingent on the strength of the regulatory framework (Jamasb et al, 20044; Mota, 
2003). An extension of this category focuses on quantifiable social impacts of deregulation 
(Galal et al, 1994; Domah and Pollitt, 2001; Toba, 2004). Galal et al (1994) pioneered the 
popular use of this technique in a social-cost-benefit-analysis of the divestiture of two Chilean 
electricity companies, focusing on changes in efficiency, investment and consumer welfare. 
Related empirical studies extrapolate these social impacts to investigate sustainable 
development (Dubash, 2002).  
 
A developing methodological literature exists on the econometric assessment of reform on a 
set of defined performance measures. Nagayama (2007) analyses the effects of reform on 
industrial and household electricity prices using a panel data set of 83 developing countries in 
three world regions10 for 1985-2002. The study follows Steiner (2001) and Hattori and 
Tsutsui (2004), investigating the impact of reforms on a set of performance measures, where 
each measure is a function of (i) country-specific effects, (ii) a set of controls and, (iii) a set of 
regulatory reform indicators. Nagayama hypothesises that privatisation and competition will 
only work with independent regulation. Cubbin and Stern (2005) investigate whether, for 28 
developing countries, from 1998-2001, the existence of a regulatory law and higher quality 
                                                 
7 The National Capital Territory of Delhi has been included as a state. 
8 Electricity is a ‘concurrent’ subject in the Indian Constitution, allowing states considerable autonomy.  
9 The establishment of a credible independent regulatory institution. 
10 This does not include Asian developing countries. 
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regulatory governance was associated with superior electricity outcomes. The scope of the 
study is limited by data, and by the fact that efficiency indicators can be expanded to include 
variables such as commercial loss reductions (Cubbin and Stern, 2005). Some studies give 
weight to the supply side in reform outcomes. Weinmann and Bunn (2004) analyse how 
industry structure and resource endowment of a country affect the feasibility of reform. This 
precludes that given a set of structural characteristics ‘substantial’ policy reforms are only 
effective to an extent.  
 
Although a comprehensive review is beyond our scope, it is observed from existing literature 
that a commonly-observed set of impacts of electricity reform on key variables affected at the 
macro level begin to emerge; sector efficiency, electricity prices, and forms of investment 
(investment within the electricity sector and new investment flows). This study undertakes the 
investigation of these economic outcomes for the case of Indian states. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 The method adopted is one outlined in a review by Jamasb et al (2004), where existing 
empirical studies are examined and critiqued in categories comprising sets of relevant 
hypotheses. Thus, a set of core hypotheses were developed to examine the behaviour of key 
economic variables in the Indian context. These were then operationalised using appropriate 
econometric techniques. 
 
H1. Alongside other infrastructure types, the stock of electricity infrastructure in an 
Indian state makes a positive and significant contribution to its industrial economic 
output. 
This hypothesis aims to outline the contribution of electricity within other 
infrastructure, to industrial economic output in Indian states, as an obvious but necessary step. 
The contribution of infrastructure to economic growth has been well-established in literature 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Ferguson et al, 2000; Ghosh, 2000; Gray, 2001; Demurger, 
2001; Roller and Waverman, 2001; Fink et al, 2002; Calderon and Serven, 2003; Esfahani 
and Ramirez, 2003; Vickerman, 2004; Vagliasindi, 2004; Cubbin and Stern, 2005; Purfield, 
2006). Other infrastructure types examined here include telecommunications, roads, and 
railways.  
 
H1.1 The stock of electricity infrastructure in an Indian state makes a positive and 
significant contribution to its industrial GDP. 
H1.2 The stock of electricity infrastructure in an Indian state makes a positive and 
significant contribution to its industrial GDP per capita. 
 
This hypothesis is examined in two separate regressions, for two dependent variables; total 
GDP of the industrial sector, and GDP per capita of the industrial sector, at constant prices 
(1993-94). The total length of transmission and distribution lines, percentage growth in direct 
exchange lines, total length of national highways and total length of railway tracks, for Indian 
states, are used to represent electricity, telecommunications11, roads, and railways 
infrastructure, respectively. Population numbers are used as controls. As most of these 
indicators are measures of total stock12, it follows that the same may be influenced to an 
extent by the capacity of each state to support such stock; in other words, by its size. 
Population is therefore used as a proxy, as it provides a measure of size that is not time-
                                                 
11 The telecoms indicator was chosen based on data availability; direct exchange lines refer to a fixed line 
connection between a telephone instrument and the local telephone exchange. 
12 Apart from the telecoms indicator. 
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invariant13. Further, population includes migrant workers, and larger populations could 
possibly, but not necessarily, be indicative of positive effects of economic prosperity, and also 
of purchasing power. All of the aforementioned are possible outside influences on the 
dependent variables. Additionally, we account for interaction effects between electricity and 
other infrastructure. Two interaction variables were developed for infrastructure thought to act 
in cohesion with electricity i.e. electricity and rail, and, electricity and roads. 
Telecommunications was taken to be relatively free of interaction with electricity, as 
tremendous expansion in mobile connectivity has ensured this independence. Both sub-
hypotheses are tested first with and then without the interaction variables. 
 
H2. Indian states more advanced in reform are more likely to have experienced 
improvements in technical and operating efficiency, in electricity provision. 
Efficiency improvements were among the commonly observed impacts of reform. 
Reforms involve restructuring of the electricity industry, and unbundling of its components 
into separate companies dealing with the functions of generation, transmission, and 
distribution and retail supply. This precedes a change in management, which results in 
commercially-oriented operations, in contrast to the management style of former state-owned 
monolithic companies. There may be revised targets on performance parameters, such as loss 
reduction. Consequently, technical efficiency improves, resulting in efficient utilisation of 
existing capacity and capital. Studies show that efficiency improvements tend to be passed on, 
either directly to consumers, through price reductions or dividend payouts14, or indirectly, 
through reinvestment in the system network (Galal et al, 1994; Domah and Pollitt, 2001; 
Harris, 2003; Ennis and Pinto, 2004; Jamasb et al, 2004; Mota, 2003; Toba, 2004; Pollitt, 
2004). This could particularly benefit industrial consumers, given that they bear the greatest 
distortions. A multivariate form of regression is used; three interrelated dependent variables 
are selected to represent technical efficiency, as the latter encompasses aspects that cannot be 
measured by one variable alone15. These are Plant Load Factor or PLF (%)16, gross generation 
(Million Kilowatt Hours) and transmission and distribution losses (%). PLF is directly related 
to the improved ability of the sector to increase its utilisation of generation capacity.  
Transmission and distribution losses refer to the ability of companies to reduce technical and 
non-technical losses, which in some states have been as high as 40%17. There may be a 
tendency for losses to remain high in the initial stages of reform, as previously hidden 
distortions are revealed following deregulation. Gross generation relates to improved PLFs 
and additions to generating capacity, facilitated by the entry of private actors.  
 
The independent variables used include six reform indicators18; these were based on cross-
country analyses by Bacon (1999) and Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), which identify six 
measures considered important to an electricity reform, undertaken in sequence. If a country’s 
reform included a measure, it was scored 1; if not, 0. Each country also had a total score out 
of six. We adapted this approach for each Indian state, for each year in the data series. Two 
further independent variables were constructed here; the ratio of industrial to domestic price 
                                                 
13 This conforms to the properties of the fixed effects technique used in operationalising this hypothesis. Time 
invariant variables may not be used in fixed effects estimations, as they are eliminated in the transformation 
process.  
14 This signifies a form of return to consumers invested in public electricity companies, as is the case in India. 
15 We outline this further, later in this section. 
16 Plant Load Factor is the percentage of total thermal generation capacity being used at any one point of time by 
the system; it is pertinent in the Indian case, as 70% of generation is thermal. Over time, PLF in India has 
increased to >70%. 
17 E.g. Bihar. 
18 These indicators are listed, along with all other variables, in Table 3.1. 
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of electricity (a commonly used indicator) and more particularly, of industrial to agricultural 
price of electricity, to represent cross-subsidisation from industry to other consumers. In 
India, it is not residential (domestic) consumer prices that influence industrial price levels, as 
much as agricultural prices. Farmers have historically influenced electricity policy, as they 
constitute the majority of the electorate, at 70% of the working population. Among control 
variables, the percentage of hydro capacity is used to represent natural resource advantages; 
states endowed with hydroelectricity could benefit from lesser coal dependency and higher 
efficiency levels; it may also affect the extent of deregulation, as hydroelectric reserves are 
state-controlled. Finally, state GDP per capita is used to control for effects relating to the state 
economy.  
 
H3. Electricity reform has had a substantive impact on electricity prices for the end-
consumer. 
A common impact of reforms (Steiner, 2001; Domah and Pollitt, 2001; Kikeri and 
Nellis, 2004; Pollitt, 2004; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004; Nagayama, 2007), is that on prices for 
the consumer. As outcomes might depend on non-economic factors, there could be a lag 
between implementation and impact. Relative to the impacts observed in other developed or 
even developing economies, the impacts on electricity prices for Indian states are distinctive, 
owing to the complex processes underlying the pricing mechanism, which are influenced by 
political, socio-cultural, and other non-economic factors. As these necessitate a clearer 
definition of price, this hypothesis is further broken down: 
 
H3.1. Reform has had a substantive impact on the average unit price of electricity. 
H3.2. Reform has had a substantive impact on the industrial unit price of electricity. 
 
H3.1 examines the impact of reform on average prices across all consumer segments. In the 
Indian case, it is difficult to predict the outcome and direction of average prices alone, as the 
latter have several underlying elements that are complex to untangle. Thus, in H3.2, we 
untangle further, the impacts on average prices for industrial consumers. In general, reforms 
aim at correcting price distortions. In the case of a developing economy, this would imply a 
reduction in excessive rates for industrial users, and an increase in prices for subsidised 
consumers, which generally comprise agriculture. The dependent variables used in each 
hypothesis, respectively, are average price of electricity per unit and, average price of 
electricity per unit for the industrial consumer19, both measured in Rupees per Kilowatt Hour 
and adjusted for inflation (1993-94 prices). Independent and control variables include the six 
reform measures, and per capita GDP of Indian states at constant prices.  
 
H4. Electricity reform in Indian states has had a substantive effect on pricing.  
As opposed to prices, this hypothesis aims to unravel the impact on the actual pricing 
mechanism of electricity in different states, following the implementation of reforms. As 
observed in studies of other developing and developed economies’ electricity programmes, 
pricing corrections are brought about through reductions in cross-subsidies and corrections in 
the relationship of average cost to average price per unit (Steiner, 2001; Hattori and Tsutsui, 
2004; Nagayama, 2006). This hypothesis explores these changes in the Indian context, and 
provides insight into the impact on prices in the previous hypothesis, in terms of potential 
causality20. This hypothesis is further broken down and examined: 
  
                                                 
19 These are averaged across two categories of industrial consumers; High Tension (large industry) and 
Medium/Low Tension (medium/small industry). 
20 The factors causing price changes, which per se are outcomes of reforms. 
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H4.1 Electricity reform in Indian states has had a substantive effect on the pricing 
mechanism of electricity with regard to relative industrial to domestic (residential) 
electricity price. 
H4.2 Electricity reform in Indian states has had a substantive effect on the pricing 
mechanism of electricity with regard to relative industrial to agricultural electricity price. 
 
H4.1 attempts to establish the effects of reform on subsidies from the industrial to the 
domestic consumer segment. Although these subsidies are a common characteristic of 
developed countries’ electricity sectors, they are observed to a lesser extent in India, where 
the predominant historical relationship lies between industry and agriculture. H4.1 could 
potentially reveal the impacts on the pricing mechanism in states where the composition of 
the agricultural consumer segment is lower, relative to other consumer segments21. Thus, the 
dependent variable is the ratio of industrial to domestic price per unit of electricity. H4.2 
examines the issue of cross-subsidisation. Cross-subsidies are mainly provided from industry 
to agriculture, and this has led to a culture of free electricity provided to farmers in states 
where the electricity sector has been used for political leverage. Reform and independent 
regulation aim at reducing cross subsidies, introducing competitive pricing for industrial 
consumers and a basic tariff for farmers. Pricing corrections are expected to have certain 
knock-on effects, such as curbing wastage among farmers, to whom the marginal cost of 
electricity is sometimes zero. The dependent variable is modelled on the concept of the 
industrial to residential price ratio, used in countries where industries mainly subsidise 
residential consumers (Steiner, 2001; Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004; Nagayama, 2006). Thus, the 
ratio of industrial to agricultural prices is used as a dependent variable. Independent variables 
in both cases include the reform indicators, and controls for economy effects (per capita GDP 
in states at constant prices). 
 
H5. Electricity reform has led to investments into the distribution and supply network, 
thereby improving quality of service. 
Along with price rationalisation, quality of supply is a major factor in fostering sector 
competitiveness, and contributing to an environment encouraging industrial development and 
local entrepreneurship. This hypothesis may be read with H2, which looked at the efficiency 
impacts of reform. Improved efficiency could lead to cost-savings and the release of 
previously constrained capital which might be reinvested into the system (Zhang et al, 2003; 
Harris, 2003; Pollit, 2004). Privatisation is not a necessity for efficiency improvements; as 
noted in Newbery (1995), experience suggests that efficiency depends more on the form of 
regulation than ownership22. Therefore, efficiency gains and resultant effects on reinvestment 
would hold in the Indian context, although there are only two states with privatised 
distribution. The independent variables include the reform indicators, industrial to agricultural 
price ratio as indicative of the extent of cross-subsidisation (reductions in this would reflect 
competitive pricing)23, the industrial to domestic price ratio as a supplementary indicator of 
price corrections, and a control variable for economy effects (per capita GDP of states). Both 
ratios are used as control variables, as pricing can in this context be considered a direct policy 
measure (through ‘tariff orders’) in Indian states, rather than a competitive outcome of reform. 
The dependent variable is the energy shortage (%). Data availability on network quality is 
limited, as accurate records have often not been maintained by utilities. For instance, the peak 
                                                 
21 For example, Delhi, which has the highest rate of urbanisation in India. 
22 Changes in ownership should be accompanied by mandatory competitive practices, and this mandate could be 
implemented by the regulator.  
23 Reductions in cross subsidies would in themselves lead to the release of previously constrained capital, thus 
improving efficiency. 
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deficit (%) might be argued to be more suited to this hypothesis; however, reliable data was 
unavailable. The results of this hypothesis must therefore be regarded with reference to the 
chronic energy shortage that currently exists across India, and the existing generation 
capacity. 
 
H6. Electricity sector reform has led to substantive changes in electricity consumption 
by the industrial consumer segment.  
Changes in the composition and magnitude of electricity consumption in a growing 
developing economy can be revealing of the net downstream impact of a reform programme. 
It might be possible to discern, whilst accounting for other factors unrelated to reforms, the 
probable response of industry to specific reform measures, by relating these to patterns of 
industrial consumption over time. Two indicators of industrial consumption are used in 
separate regression specifications; namely, total industrial consumption and per capita 
industrial consumption. The first would be indicative of absolute changes in industrial 
consumption, and the second would be indicative of the distribution of these; that is, whether 
the response is even across all industrial consumers, or whether consumption from specific 
segments of industry goes up disproportionately relative to others. The same independent 
variables are used in both regressions; the reform measures, industrial to agricultural price 
ratio, industrial to residential price ratio, and per capita GDP for economy effects 
(representing the contribution of the economic environment to consumption). 
  
The data used is set out in Table 3.1. Data were constructed from public sources, and some 
protected portions, with requisite permission; specifically, the Power Ministry and State 
Electricity Regulatory Commissions. Sources included the Planning Commission, Power 
Finance Corporation, Central Electricity Authority, Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), 
the EPW Research Foundation and The Energy and Resources Institute.  The time period 
spans 1990-2007 at the most, and 1990-2004 at the least, as per availability. All 29 states24 are 
not included in this analysis. Among the 11 excluded states are 7 that comprise the entire 
northeastern region25, which have been traditionally considered underdeveloped smaller 
economies and prone to experiencing governance problems and civil unrest. Data on these is 
unavailable, owing to the lack of a sustained system of record keeping at the ground level. 
Further, 3 26 of the 11 states were created in 2000, and sufficient data does not exist for a 
comprehensive study; moreover, the inclusion of these smaller states might distort results. 
Finally, the tourist economy of Goa has been conditionally included, on the basis of data 
availability; it has been classified as under-industrialised27 as it has a tourism-based economy. 
Therefore, its exclusion in some cases does not preclude economically substantive results. 
The states included account for over 85% of the population28. Annual data were used, and 
monetary units adjusted for inflation using the Wholesale Price Index (WPI). For GDP 
computations, the base 1980-81 was revised in 1993-94. Thus, data prior to 1993 was rebased 
to 1993-94 prices. Where aggregate GDP data was unavailable, it was constructed following 
CSO guidelines, by aggregating the economic output of the mining and quarrying, 
construction, manufacturing, and, electricity, gas and water sectors. Appendix I contains 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis29.  
                                                 
24 We have included the National Capital Territory of Delhi as a state. 
25 Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura. 
26 Jharkhand (out of Bihar), Chhattisgarh (out of Madhya Pradesh), Uttaranchal (out of Uttar Pradesh). 
27 In the Annual Survey of Industries. 
28 Based on 2004-05 population figures. 
29 We follow an approach advocated by Ziliak and McCloskey (1996; 2004), observing for size of coefficients, 
economic significance of variables, and standard deviations, in addition to statistical significance. 
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 Table 3.1: List and Description of Variables 
 Variable Description Units 
Reform 
Variables 
IPPS* Presence of Independent Power 
Producers in a state 
Dummy (0/1) 
REG Presence of an Independent Regulatory 
Agency in a state 
Dummy (0/1) 
UNB Separation of generation, transmission 
& distribution segments in a state  
Dummy (0/1) 
TAR Passing of tariff orders in a state 
(correcting price distortions) 
Dummy (0/1) 
OPREG** Introduction of Open Access to the 
transmission & distribution network by 
third parties  
Dummy (0/1) 
 
DPVT*** Privatisation of the distribution segment 
(amongst two or more companies) 
Dummy (0/1) 
REFINDEX Aggregate Reform Index Total score out of 6 
 
Other 
Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INDGDP1 State Industrial GDP; adjusted for 
inflation at constant (1993-94) prices 
Million Rupees  
INDPC State Industrial GDP per capita; 
adjusted for inflation at constant (1993-
94) prices 
Rupees 
ELEC Length of transmission & distribution 
lines in a state 
Circuit kilometres 
RDS1 Length of national highways in a state Kilometres 
 
RAIL Length of railway track in a state Circuit kilometres 
 
TEL Growth in number of direct exchange 
lines in a state 
Percentage (%) 
INTER1 ELEC * RAIL Circuit kilometres 
 
INTER2 ELEC * RDS1 Circuit kilometres 
 
PRATIO1 Ratio of industrial to domestic price of 
electricity; adjusted for inflation at 
constant (1993-94) prices 
Rupees per unit 
PRATIO2 
 
Ratio of industrial to agricultural price 
of  electricity; adjusted for inflation at 
constant (1993-94) prices 
Rupees per unit 
 
PLF Plant Load Factor of grid-connected 
thermal power stations in a state 
Percentage 
TDL Transmission & distribution losses in a 
state 
Percentage 
GRGEN Gross Generation of thermal power 
plants in a state 
Million Kilowatt Hours 
INPRICE Average industrial price of electricity in 
a state; adjusted for inflation at constant 
(1993-94) prices 
Rupees per unit 
PRICE Average price of electricity in a state; 
adjusted for inflation at constant (1993-
94) prices 
Rupees per unit 
INDCON Industrial consumption of electricity in Million Kilowatt Hours 
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a state  
INDCONPC Industrial consumption of electricity per 
capita in a state 
Kilowatt Hours 
 
PWDF Percentage Energy Deficit in states Percentage 
 
HYDRO1 Hydroelectric generation capacity in a 
state 
Percentage 
PCGDP Per capita state GDP; adjusted for 
inflation at constant (1993-94) prices  
Million Rupees 
POPN Population of states Millions of people 
 
*Data obtained from the World Bank’s PPIAF Database30. 
** Open access is usually introduced in phases based on consumer size, and in Indian states comes with 
wheeling and cross subsidy surcharges imposed by the Transmission Company or independent regulator. 
*** Only two states have privatised distribution completely. 
 
The dataset comprises a number of cross-sections, with a relatively short time series 
(approximately 17), constituting an unbalanced panel. Given that the cross-sections represent 
Indian states, which are decentralised, somewhat self-contained economic systems, there is 
presumably a range of state-specific unobserved factors influencing the behaviour of each. 
Hence we use techniques from panel data econometrics, which are best placed to deal with 
this heterogeneity in the micro-units31. Within panel data, the choice lies between fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators, which differ in the way they model the 
unobserved heterogeneity. The FE estimator deals with it explicitly in the estimation process 
by putting in a dummy for each individual; it is thus also referred to as the Least Squares 
Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator. The RE estimator implicitly recognises it, and assumes 
the different intercepts as having been drawn from a bowl of possible intercepts, so they may 
be interpreted as random, and treated as though they were a part of the error term. The FE 
estimator is always consistent32, but the RE estimator, where applicable33, is more efficient34, 
as the method of transformation used in the estimation process saves on degrees of freedom. 
In order to conform to desirable properties of an estimator (unbiasedness), RE estimators are 
applicable solely under the assumption that the individual effects (and hence the composite 
error term) are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. Standard procedure dictates that 
this choice is usually determined through the use of a Hausman Test.  
 
However, the cross-sections in this dataset represent Indian states, which are autonomous 
systems; these differences could thus represent unobserved heterogeneity. If this unobserved 
heterogeneity was contained in variables indicative of factors such as the institutional 
environment, or levels of governance, it is highly likely that the unobserved heterogeneity, 
and hence the individual effects, would be correlated with the independent variables i.e. 
factors such as governance and institutions could influence explanatory variables. Thus, the 
core assumption for a RE model could be violated in this case. We thus use FE estimators. A 
second justification for FE estimators here is that the data does not represent a random 
sample; further, as the total number of states (cross-sections) is limited, the data comprises a 
                                                 
30 The IPP variable pertained to the start of operations of a generation project. 
31 Kennedy (2008) provides a detailed exposition of panel data techniques and the choice of fixed versus random 
effects estimators in applied econometric research. 
32 The estimator converges in probability to the true value of the parameter.  
33 The variables being used and the relationships being hypothesised must satisfy certain assumptions. 
34 Minimises variance amongst unbiased estimators. 
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finite sample. The model specification is thus: it i it i itY Xα β η ε= + + + , which represents a 
fixed effects static model. For static models, FE estimations were carried out on the data. The 
estimates were tested for non-spherical errors using a Likelihood-Ratio (LR) Test for panel-
level heteroskedasticity and a Wooldridge test for serial correlation. Where non-spherical 
errors were detected, the estimations were adjusted for these. Thus, for hypotheses using static 
models, two FE model estimations have been reported for consistency of results. The first 
with robust-variance estimates using STATA’s xtreg and vce(robust) commands; the second 
with an error term that is first order autoregressive, or AR (1), using STATA’s xtregar 
command. 
 
For some of the relationships hypothesised, standard economic reasoning implies that the 
behaviour of some dependent variables may not only be determined by the set of independent 
and control variables specified in the equation, but also on past values of themselves; namely, 
past decisions have an impact on current behaviour (Bruno, 2005). We use a dynamic 
specification for these 1it it it i itY Y Xγ β η ε−= + + +  where 1itYγ −  is the coefficient and the lagged 
value of the dependent variable and itX β  represents the matrix of coefficients and the 
explanatory variables. Thus, in order to estimate hypotheses that include a dynamic element, 
dynamic LSDV panel data models are used. However, it must be noted that the data used in 
this analysis has a small time dimension, ‘T’. It is established in econometric literature that a 
LSDV model with a lagged dependent variable generates biased estimates when T is small; 
thus, LSDV performs well only when T is large (Judson and Owen, 1999). Kiviet (1995) 
devised a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC), later refined by Bun and Kiviet (2003), 
which is generally seen to have the lowest RMSE35 for panels of all sizes; its applicability 
was, however, limited to balanced panels. A version of the bias-corrected LSDV estimator 
(LSDVC) for unbalanced panels was developed by Bruno (2005), which operates under two 
assumptions; first, it has a strictly exogenous selection rule, and second, it classifies the error 
term itε as an ‘unobserved white noise disturbance’. The procedure for obtaining results from a 
LSDVC estimator from an unbalanced panel is through the STATA routine xtlsdvc; 
uncorrected LSDV estimates are first obtained. Then, using Kiviet’s higher order asymptotic 
expansion techniques, the small sample bias of the estimator is approximated (Bruno, 2005). 
The approximations terms, however, all evaluated at the unobserved true parameter values, 
are of no direct use for estimation; thus to make them operational, the true parameter values 
are replaced by estimates from some consistent estimator (Bruno, 2005). The chosen 
estimator is plugged into the bias approximations formulae, and the resulting bias 
approximation estimates iβ  can be subtracted to obtain the corrected LSDV estimator as 
follows: i iLSDVC LSDV β= − , where i = 1,2 and 3, indicating the accuracy of the bias 
approximation36. The choice of consistent estimators used to initialise the bias approximations 
lies between the Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators.  
 
A number of other consistent Instrumental Variable (IV) and Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators have been proposed in econometric literature as an alternative to 
LSDV in the modelling of dynamic panel data. However, Bruno (2005) evaluates the relative 
performance of LSDVC in comparison to LSDV, Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and 
Blundell-Bond estimators for unbalanced panels with small N and concludes that the three 
versions of LSDVC computed by STATA outperform all other estimators in terms of bias and 
                                                 
35 Root Mean Square Error 
36 In STATA the default is set equal to 1. 
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RMSE. We thus choose to use LSDVC models for those hypotheses that involve dynamic 
relationships, and report results from all three estimators used to initialise the bias corrections 
(Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond). The variables used as regressors 
conform to the exogenous selection rule, in that they include dummies to represent the various 
measures of electricity sector reform and deregulation. Amongst the regressors used are price 
ratios, which can also be considered exogenous in this context, as these indicate an attempt to 
model the underlying rate of change, rather than the variables themselves. The use of ratios 
also solves any problems with multicollinearity amongst the regressor variables (Kennedy, 
2008). Standard test statistics are also reported; the Arellano-Bond estimator reports a test for 
first and second order autocorrelation, respectively. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. 
The presence of first order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals does not imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent, but second-order correlation would. Additionally, the Blundell-
Bond estimator reports a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions; the estimates should test 
significantly different from zero in order to reject the null that overidentifying restrictions are 
valid. Fractional polynomial prediction plots of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables are included, as a visual depiction of results37.  
 
An exception to the general model specification has been made for hypothesis two (H2), 
where the equation is specified in a multivariate form, which conditions the choice of 
technique. The motivation for this specification is twofold.  First, H2 looks at the concept of 
technical efficiency in entirety, and not in terms of a disjointed set of concepts; the three 
dependent variables are presented as parts of a whole, and belonging to the same ‘universe’ of 
variables. Secondly, the variables are by nature expected to display certain interdependent 
relationships, which might later be confirmed through econometric and statistical observation. 
Although the generic equation is specified in a multivariate form, the nature of the data 
impedes the use of a multivariate regression model to arrive at results; in a multivariate panel 
data regression, a separate equation is estimated for each panel, and then parameters of the 
independent variables are constrained to be the same. Each panel for a multivariate model, in 
this case, is 17 years deep; however, after accounting for missing data, there are insufficient 
observations to run a multivariate analysis on each panel. To overcome these impediments, 
we use a three-stage least squares regression, using Reg3 in STATA. Reg3 estimates a system 
of structural equations, where some equations may contain endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables. These endogenous explanatory variables are the dependent variables 
from other equations in the system38. Thus, three-stage least squares can be thought of as 
producing estimates from a three-step process: (a) It develops instrumental variables for all 
the endogenous variables; these instrumented variables can simply be considered as the 
predicted values resulting from a regression of each endogenous variable on all the exogenous 
variables in the system. (b) A consistent estimate is obtained for the covariance matrix of the 
equation disturbances. These estimates are based on the residuals from a two-stage least 
squares estimate of each structural equation. (c) A GLS-type estimation is performed using 
the covariance matrix estimated in the second stage, with the instrumented values in place of 
the right hand side endogenous variables. We now proceed to report results. 
 
                                                 
37 These were constructed using STATA’s twoway fpfitci command, which calculates the prediction for yvar 
based on the estimation of a fractional polynomial of xvar and plots the resulting curve along the confidence 
interval of the mean; fpfitci plots are a tool for graphically estimating relationships between variables prior to a 
regression analysis. 
38 The dependent variables are explicitly taken to be endogenous to the system and as such are treated as 
correlated with the disturbances in the system’s equation. Thus, Y1 is estimated on all other variables in the 
system, followed by Y2 and Y3, respectively. 
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4. Econometric Results 
 
4.1  Electricity within Infrastructure 
Each sub-hypothesis was estimated using non-dynamic fixed effects panel data 
models, as this hypothesis is meant to be transitory, and thus to provide an initial indication of 
the sort of results one might expect from Indian data. Panel data for 19 states and 17 years 
were used. Two types of fixed effects estimations were carried out; one with robust standard 
errors using the robust(vce) command in STATA (Model One), and the second adjusted for 
serial correlation39 (Model Two). The former focuses on estimating coefficients on the 
independent variables, whilst the latter focuses on modelling the error term.  
Total Industrial Economic Output 
The model estimation for H1.1 can be expressed in terms of the following fixed 
effects equation: 
1 2 3 4 5
6
1 1 1
2
it i it it it it it
it it it
INDGDP ELEC RDS TEL RAIL INTER
INTER POPN
α γ β β β β β
β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + ---- (1) 
The equation is estimated with and without the interaction variables, in order to 
discern the effects of the infrastructure variables by themselves, on industrial GDP. The 
results from H1.1, with the interaction effects, for both fixed effects models, are presented in 
Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Electricity Relative to Other Infrastructure Types 
Dependent Variable: Total Industrial GDP (Million Rs.) 
 With Interaction Terms  Without Interaction Terms 
 Model One Model Two Model One Model Two 
 INDGDP1 INDGDP1 INDGDP1 INDGDP1 
INTER1  -0.00000772 -0.00000874 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.0000153) (0.0000226)   
INTER2  0.00000714 0.000000676 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.00000987) (0.0000146)   
ELEC 0.146++ 0.120 0.138** 0.0810* 
 (0.0893) (0.122) (0.0409) (0.0320) 
RDS1 10.98** 8.282 14.03*** 8.799* 
 (3.457) (7.348) (2.485) (3.407) 
TEL -820.2*** -672.5*** -824.9*** -667.5*** 
 (191.0) (157.0) (189.7) (154.0) 
RAIL 0.396 8.267 -1.711 6.206 
 (4.968) (8.338) (4.017) (6.309) 
POPN 184.9 1260.5* 133.2 1312.7* 
 (758.1) (620.1) (707.5) (589.5) 
_cons 89506.4 28040.6 90338.8 31517.1 
 (54296.2) (22356.9) (46040.5) (19655.0) 
N 142 124 142 124 
R2 0.641  0.639  
adj. R2 0.623 0.244 0.626 0.256 
Standard errors in parentheses. ++ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The interaction terms show negligible, insignificant coefficients. The coefficients on ELEC 
are roughly of the same size in both estimations, but significant only for Model One, at the 
10% level. This indicates that electricity infrastructure has contributed positively to total 
                                                 
39 With AR(1) disturbances. 
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industrial economic output in Indian states, but the nature of the contribution is difficult to 
establish and separate from interaction effects. Similarly, the coefficient on roads holds 
significant only for Model One, yet is positive and of roughly the same size for both models 
Whilst observing for comparative effects of different infrastructure types, specifically with 
regard to ELEC and RDS1, reference can be made here to Appendix I (Descriptive Statistics). 
If we follow an analytical approach put forth by McCloskey & Ziliak (1996; 2004), it is not 
just statistical significance, but rather the economic significance of regression results, which 
matters to a researcher engaged in applied economic research. Economic significance can be 
assessed using the size of the coefficients and the amount of variation in the variables being 
measured. Thus, ELEC has a small coefficient (0.146) and a high standard deviation 
(215633.9), whereas RDS1 has a large coefficient (10.98) and relatively smaller standard 
deviation (1426.451). Thus the net effect of both these regressors on the dependent variables 
will likely be of a similar magnitude.  The coefficients on TEL are negative and highly 
significant for both models. At face this might appear an adverse result. However, TEL 
represents the percentage growth in the number of direct physical exchange lines, and is 
indicative of an underlying growth rate. Given that mobile connectivity in India has grown 
exponentially since liberalisation of mobile telecommunications over the past 5 years, a 
decline in the growth rate of fixed lines could have taken place; this effect is captured here by 
the variable TEL. Thus, the results show that industrial economic output is related to a decline 
in the growth rate of fixed line connections, which can be attributed to the substitution of the 
latter with mobile connectivity40. A variable for mobile penetration over time was 
unavailable.  
 
The coefficients on RAIL are positive but insignificant. POPN shows positive coefficients, 
and a significant result in the case of Model Two; these should be interpreted with caution as, 
some highly populous states have tended to have very poor rates of industrial development. 
The results from the estimation of H1.1, dropping the interaction effects, for both fixed 
effects model estimations, are presented alongside, in Table 4.1. Here, the effects are 
amplified as a result of the analysis of each indicator independent from the interaction terms. 
ELEC shows positive, significant coefficients for both models, indicating a substantive 
contribution of electricity infrastructure to total industrial GDP. RDS1 shows positive 
significant results, indicating a strong contribution of road infrastructure to industrial GDP. 
The results for TEL remain the same as those estimated with interaction effects, predictably, 
and the same justification holds. The coefficients on RAIL are insignificant for both models, 
but negative in Model One, providing inconclusive results. POPN shows positive coefficients. 
Again, the interpretation is debatable but POPN serves only as a control variable here41. 
                                                 
40 Due to the unavailability of data, the TEL variable was also used to construct an index, as opposed to 
percentage growth rates; however, the results did not differ substantially. Hamilton (2003) investigates whether 
fixed lines and mobile telephony are complements or substitutes, using evidence from Africa. The study suggests 
that it is possible that mobile and main lines are sometimes substitutes, where fixed line access is low, and at 
other times complements in consumption.  
41 A general consideration that might arise here is whether the population and infrastructure variables are 
affected by multicollinearity, as states with greater populations might be expected to have greater amounts of 
infrastructure. However, this becomes an issue of concern only in the instance of perfect multicollinearity (exact 
linear relationships between explanatory variables) as this results in a singular matrix, such that the 
transformation and thus econometric estimation, cannot be carried out. An examination of the correlation 
coefficients confirms that there is no perfect correlation between population and the infrastructure variables 
(popn/elec=0.7240; popn/rds1= 0.8540; popn/rail=0.8862; popn/tel=0.0522). This indicates the absence of 
perfect multicollinearity, rendering the results valid. Moreover, in Indian states, it is often the case that states 
with larger populations are often the poorest ones (e.g. Uttar Pradesh has the highest state population, and is one 
of the least-developed), and thus do not have an infrastructure stock proportionate to their population size. 
Concerns of multicollinearity are thus alleviated through both economic and econometric reasoning. 
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Reviewing the results from both regressions on INDGDP1, it is possible that the negative 
coefficient on INTER1 could be partly explained by the negative coefficient on RAIL, thus 
strengthening the conclusion that electricity has a positive (and in most cases, significant) 
contribution to INDGDP1. Overall, the model fit is seen to be better for Model One, for 
estimations with and without the interaction effects, as indicated by the R statistics.  
 
Industrial Economic Output Per Capita 
The model estimation for H1.2 is expressed in terms of the following fixed effects 
equation: 
1 2 3 4 5
6
1 1 1
2
it i it it it it it
it it it
INDPC ELEC RDS TEL RAIL INTER
INTER POPN
α γ β β β β β
β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + ----------- (2) 
This hypothesis is examined first with, and then without the interaction effects. The results 
from the estimation of H1.2, with the interaction effects are presented in Table 4.2. The 
coefficients on the interaction variables are negligible, indicating the absence of substantive 
influence on INDPC. INTER1 is significant for Model One, but has a negative, negligible 
coefficient. ELEC shows positive coefficients for both estimations, but holds significant to a 
moderate level only for Model One. The coefficients on road infrastructure are positive for 
both estimations, and significant for Model One. Thus, both ELEC and RDS1 show a positive 
contribution to INDPC, but to a nebulous extent. 
Table 4.2: Electricity Relative to Other Infrastructure Types 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Industrial GDP (Rs.) 
 With Interaction Terms Without Interaction Terms 
 Model One Model Two Model One Model Two 
 INDPC INDPC INDPC INDPC 
INTER1  -0.00000127* -0.000000604 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.000000522) (0.00000107)   
INTER2  -0.000000148 2.07e-08 Dropped Dropped 
 (0.000000356) (0.000000913)   
ELEC 0.00754** 0.00382 0.000657 0.000914 
 (0.00269) (0.00462) (0.000565) (0.000708) 
RDS1 0.418* 0.355 0.402*** 0.337 
 (0.184) (0.424) (0.0963) (0.204) 
TEL -19.98*** -16.70** -20.19*** -16.29** 
 (5.325) (4.995) (5.069) (4.791) 
RAIL 0.527** 0.227 0.288* 0.110 
 (0.188) (0.282) (0.143) (0.221) 
POPN 39.73 -3.345 29.49 -1.049 
 (38.70) (16.76) (34.80) (15.98) 
_cons -251.2 2345.3** 1120.2 2743.8*** 
 (1777.4) (799.3) (1454.7) (583.8) 
N 71 62 71 62 
R2 0.562  0.541  
adj. R2 0.513 0.051 0.506 0.066 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The results for TEL match up with those estimated for H1.1. The results from the estimation 
of H1.2, dropping the interaction effects, are presented in Table 4.2. ELEC shows relatively 
small and insignificant coefficients for both models, suggesting that it might not contribute 
much, in isolation, to industrial output per capita. The coefficient on roads is positive for both 
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
15 
 
estimations, but highly significant only for Model One. The results for TEL hold consistent, 
indicating that, as explained before, TEL is associated with higher industrial output per capita.  
Figure 4.1: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot for Electricity Infrastructure versus Total 
Industrial GDP 
 
Figure 4.2: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot for Road Infrastructure versus Total 
Industrial GDP 
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Figure 4.3: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot for Fixed Telecoms Infrastructure versus 
Total Industrial GDP 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot for Rail Infrastructure versus Total Industrial 
GDP 
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RAIL shows a positive, significant coefficient for Model One. In the case of INDPC, Model 
One is found to explain a larger proportion of the associated impacts, as seen by the R 
statistics. Figures 4.1 to 4.4 depict fractional polynomial prediction plots of the relationship 
between each of the independent variables and total industrial GDP. Electricity demonstrates 
a strong positive relationship with total industrial GDP. The overall conclusions from H1 are 
that electricity has contributed substantially and significantly to total industrial output in 
Indian states. However, its contribution to industrial output per capita, appears mixed, and not 
as potent as telecoms or roads. A possible limitation of the above is that the variables used 
reflect the availability of electricity networks, rather than the level of electricity usage; and 
some states may have higher average consumption than others. However, suitable indicators 
for consumption levels were not available. 
 
4.2 Efficiency Impacts of Reform 
This hypothesis is examined using equation (3) and a three-stage least squares method. 
 
f (PLF+TDL+GRGEN) =f ( IPPS+REG+UNB+TAR+OPREG+DPVT+PRATIO1+ 
                                    PRATIO2+PCGDP+HYDRO1) ------------------ (3) 
The equation has been specified in a multivariate form, which conditions the choice of 
technique within regression analysis. The justification relates to the dependent variables and 
to data limitations. Efficiency can be measured by both commercial and technical parameters. 
Data on commercial efficiency in India is incomplete and unreliable; in some instances, audits 
were carried out as late as 200242. It is expected that commercial efficiency parameters will 
have improved post-reform, but data on the same was not available. Arguably, examining 
commercial efficiency would most easily set out the impacts of reform, as financial 
insolvency is widely perceived to have been the root of the crisis. However, due to the reasons 
mentioned above, the focus of the hypothesis is on technical efficiency and its associated 
impacts with commercial efficiency. Subsequently, technical efficiency parameters may be 
interrelated, and thus are expected to display certain interdependent relationships; thus, for 
instance, we could hypothesise an interdependent inverse relationship between PLF and 
GRGEN specifically in the presence of IPPs, and observe for the same in the analysis43. Thus, 
this hypothesis looks at the concept of technical efficiency in entirety. This property qualifies 
the multivariate specification, and helps to capture relationships that might be lost in 
individual specifications. Annual data are analysed for 18 Indian states, covering 17 years. 
The econometric results are presented in Table 4.3.  
 
Plant Load Factor (PLF) 
 Significant results are obtained for four variables. Unbundling (UNB) shows a 
positive, highly significant effect on PLF. The splitting of the sector leads to a fragmented 
structure, particularly in the initial stages. Thus, plants may be pressed to improve their PLF. 
This effect is substantive, as the coefficient on UNB is large. Tariff orders (TAR) have a 
positive, significant effect on PLF as cost-reflective tariffs encourage higher levels of PLF. 
Power shortages and subsidies have traditionally led industries to opt for more captive 
generation than would be economically justified. Thus, price corrections brought about by 
                                                 
42 Prior to the Delhi privatisations. 
43 Higher levels of PLF relate to lower levels of GRGEN and vice versa, conditional upon the existence and 
extent of Independent Power Producers (IPPS). The presence of IPPS in a state augments GRGEN; thus, PLF 
levels, which have traditionally been lower than average across India, are expected to fall further, as a greater 
number of plants generate electricity to the system, easing up the pressure on individual plants to generate at full 
capacity. This relationship is counterintuitive to that expected in a conventional reform programme. However, as 
earlier, the Indian reform experience is distinctive, in that political economy has long influenced its direction and 
outcomes.  
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TAR lead to lower prices for industrial consumers, who are drawn back to the state grid since 
off-grid options become uneconomical; thus the system is under pressure to improve PLF to 
meet demand. PRATIO2 has a positive, highly significant effect on PLF.  A higher PRATIO2 
indicates higher industrial prices, relative to lower agricultural prices, reflecting high cross-
subsidisation44. The latter leads to high agricultural consumption, which puts pressure on 
plants to meet demand, thus PLF may increase. HYDRO1 has a negative, highly significant 
effect on PLF. Note that PLF only includes thermal generation. Hence, higher HYDRO1 leads 
to a lower PLF. Hydroelectricity is cheaper and more efficient to produce, and states with 
higher levels of HYDRO1 have an advantage over those without. Thus, PLF will be low as 
the pressure on the thermal system reduces.   
 
Transmission and Distribution (Energy) Losses (TDL) 
Four variables are significant. REG has a positive, highly significant coefficient on 
TDL. This is an expected result as initial reform measures tend to reveal previously hidden 
levels of network losses. Prior to reform, State Electricity Boards would often report losses 
clubbed with agricultural consumption, to hide true levels of losses. UNB has a positive, 
highly significant coefficient on TDL, again indicating that in initial reform stages, the sector 
has to contend with true losses that are revealed during restructuring. Again, DPVT has a 
positive, significant coefficient on TDL as true levels of losses are revealed in the initial 
stages of reform. Moreover, in distribution privatisations, the basis for awarding bids have 
been whether annual loss reduction targets match with those projected by government 
analyses. The Delhi privatisations were carried out on this basis in 2000, and required an audit 
to establish the actual levels of TDL. The private owners were expected to meet 
predetermined loss reduction targets in subsequent years. PRATIO2 has a negative, 
significant coefficient on TDL. A high PRATIO2 indicates high industrial prices relative to 
agricultural prices and cross-subsidisation. In such a situation, agricultural consumption 
increases to excessive levels. There may thus be a tendency for state-owned companies to 
include network losses with agricultural consumption to conceal inefficiencies in operations. 
 
Gross Generation (GRGEN) 
IPPS shows a positive, significant coefficient on GRGEN as the introduction of IPPs 
adds to generation capacity. This could also be interpreted in relation to earlier results on 
PLF; IPPS leads to a lower PLF and a higher GRGEN, indicating a relationship between the 
two, because with the addition to generation capacity, availability of electricity in the system 
increases; thus, poorly maintained plants exhibit a low PLF because of too much ‘downtime’. 
TAR shows a positive, highly significant coefficient on GRGEN. TAR lowers prices for 
industrial consumers, which could lead to a greater demand for grid-connected electricity 
from the industrial consumer segment, and hence GRGEN increases. DPVT shows a negative, 
significant coefficient on GRGEN indicating a reduction in generation whilst the system 
reconciles to supplying electricity in the restructured sector. PRATIO2 shows a positive, 
highly significant coefficient on GRGEN. This, a high PRATIO2 increases GRGEN. A high 
PRATIO2 indicates higher industrial prices relative to agricultural prices, and is thus 
reflective of higher cross-subsidies. This implies high agricultural consumption. GRGEN 
would thus have to increase to meet increased demand. HYDRO1, as expected, shows a 
                                                 
44 The average PRATIO2 was graphed over time, across the sample of states, against an index of industrial 
prices and an index of agricultural prices for the same sample (constructed from the argument. It was seen that 
industrial prices tended to rise at a higher rate than agricultural prices of electricity, and are thus the main driver 
of changes to PRATIO2. 
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negative and highly significant coefficient on GRGEN, indicating that states with higher 
levels of hydro will have lower levels of GRGEN (thermal).  
 
Thus, some overall conclusions can be drawn. Almost all the measures of reforms have some 
implication for efficiency. For PLF, unbundling and the passing of tariff orders have the most 
significant impacts. For TDL, independent regulation, unbundling, and distribution 
privatisation have significant impacts. Finally, for GRGEN, the existence of IPPs, passing of 
tariff orders and distribution privatisation most significantly influence this variable. In India, 
the nature of the impact is highly influenced by the extent of cross-subsidisation. In the case 
of PLF, independent variables that lead to an increase in levels are taken to be a positive 
impact, provided the cross subsidies to agriculture (PRATIO2) are not exorbitant, as higher 
levels of PLF could be due to a load from increased agricultural consumption, often including 
wastage. In the case of GRGEN, reform measures that lead to higher generation would be a 
positive outcome, except in the instance of high cross-subsidies; in case of the latter, it is an 
indication of excessive agricultural demand. In case of TDL, a sign of workable reform is 
when previously hidden levels of losses come to light; hence, TDL should initially rise with 
reform; again, controlling for cross subsidies becomes essential, as high subsidies could 
induce companies to club losses with agricultural consumption.  
 
Table 4.3: Efficiency Impacts of Electricity Sector Deregulation 
Dependent Variables: PLF (%), T & D Loss (%), Gross Generation (MKWh) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 PLF TDL GRGEN 
IPPS -4.926 -2.780 3732.5* 
 (4.061) (1.448) (1777.9) 
REG -0.663 6.979*** 1142.9 
 (4.712) (1.481) (2362.4) 
UNB 26.25*** 7.753*** -5315.6 
 (4.989) (1.843) (3099.0) 
TAR 10.71* -2.336 8523.5*** 
 (5.082) (2.005) (2316.0) 
OPREG -2.917 0.504 7128.0 
 (12.65) (4.577) (7416.1) 
DPVT -15.52 6.291* -12040.6* 
 (10.93) (2.476) (5531.2) 
PRATIO1 -1.305 -0.413 -648.9 
 (1.345) (0.522) (779.6) 
PRATIO2 0.397*** -0.0488* 91.19** 
 (0.0872) (0.0204) (30.52) 
PCGDP 0.000598 0.0000323 0.440 
 (0.000341) (0.000104) (0.234) 
HYDRO1 -0.147** -0.0299 -99.17*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0206) (23.38) 
N 245   
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Some final conclusions for the above hypothesis may be stated as follows. First, the time lag 
between implementation of reforms and their outcome seems to be the shortest for PLF; this 
is followed by GRGEN, and finally, by TDL. Increasing the PLF by itself is unsustainable, as, 
assuming plants attain their highest possible levels of PLF, there will still be a need to 
increase generation beyond this threshold to keep up with rising demand. Thus, measures 
encouraging GRGEN should be carried out in line with demand projections. TDL will require 
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a time lag to attain economic sustainability, as a reform reveals true levels of losses in the 
early stages. All of the above suggests that states which have not only implemented greater 
measures of reform, but have implemented these early on, should have experienced 
substantive efficiency improvements. This has been exhibited in the state of Andhra Pradesh, 
where reforms were implemented from 1998 onwards, and levels of TDL have been reduced 
to 18% from around 30%. Thus, TDL might also be viewed as a long-term indicator of the 
efficiency impact of deregulation. The measures that affect TDL most significantly are, REG, 
UNB, and DPVT (or equivalent measures). It follows that the net impact could be that a state 
which implements a reform halfway, might end up worse off than a state that implements 
reform to near-completion, in terms of efficiency. This is because levels of TDL would 
stabilise only through long-term initiatives. As a chronic energy deficit exists across India, 
efficiency improvements can reduce wastage and technical losses, and could, alongside 
addition to installed capacity, and reduce the deficit. In light of the long lag times required to 
bring new capacity into the system, efficiency improvements could contribute significantly to 
managing short term peak demand.  
 
4.4 The Price Impacts of Reform 
Price by itself is a complex construct in the Indian scenario, going beyond economic 
principles, and involving socio-political elements. Data on average prices was available for 19 
states and for 19 years (1986–2005), with missing values. Data on industrial prices was 
available for 19 states and 16 years (1990-2006). Price would tend to be influenced not just by 
reform measures and suitable controls, but also by its past values. A dynamic specification is 
thus used to explore price impacts. Moreover, using a lagged value of the dependent variable 
would also account for the effects of omitted variables. The model estimation used is a Bias-
Corrected Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDVC) model, as this is deemed most 
appropriate for this analysis. The main assumption of the LSDVC model is the exogeneity of 
the regressor variables. As the regressors here are a set of measures that are introduced in a 
logical sequence at different times, and control variables that are per se independent of reform 
measures, this assumption can be considered fulfilled. The estimation is carried out using all 
three options for initialising the bias correction; thus, results using the Anderson-Hsiao (AH), 
Arellano-Bond (AB) and Blundell-Bond (BB) estimators for bias-corrections are presented. 
The reporting of all three options also helps check the consistency of results.  
 
Average Price of Electricity 
This sub-hypothesis was thus examined in a dynamic panel data specification with an 
equation of the following form: 
itiititit XPRICELPRICE εηβγ +++= −1. ----------------- (4) 
γ  represents the coefficient and the lagged value of PRICE; itX β  represents a vector of 
coefficients and independent variables; these include the dummy variables for the six main 
reform measures, and a control variable, namely PCGDP; iη  is the individual effect 
representing the unobserved heterogeneity in cross sections; itε  is the error term. HYDRO1 is 
not explicitly used as a control, to avoid undue stress on the dataset; as it can influence the 
extent to which a reform is undertaken, it is considered embodied in the set of reform 
indicators. The effect of HYDRO1 may also be captured in the lagged value of PRICE. The 
results from the LSDVC estimations are presented in Table 4.4. Test results relevant to the 
estimators showed no second order correlation; the Sargan test showed that the estimations 
were not robust, yet not weakened by too many instruments. L.PRICE has a positive, 
significant coefficient. IPPS, although insignificant, shows a positive coefficient across all 
three estimations. This is in conformity with the fact that electricity sold by IPPs has 
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historically been at very high rates, based on Power Purchase Agreements entered into by 
state governments, to assure investors of a return. These mechanisms have included a 
guaranteed 16% return on equity, and later, a fixed and variable cost recovery arrangement. 
PCGDP shows a positive coefficient across all three estimations, but it is significant at the 
10% level for the AH and BB estimators, and at the 5% level for the AB estimator. This result 
indicates that richer states have higher prices.  
 
Moreover, average prices encompass several consumer segments, and the price increase might 
come from any one or more of them. One possibility is that PCGDP reflects the purchasing 
power of a state’s population and ability to pay cost-reflective tariffs. The latter could thus 
have an effect on electricity prices. REG and UNB show positive but insignificant coefficients 
across all three estimations. As average prices encompass several segments of pricing, these 
two measures, being in the initial stages of reform, may not be sufficient to influence an 
immediate decline. Moreover, any reduction in prices of a specific consumer segment would 
have to be substantially strong to bring about a notable decline in the average electricity price.  
 
Table 4.4: The Price Impacts of Deregulation I: Average Price of Electricity- 
Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Average Price (Rs. per unit) 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 PRICE PRICE PRICE 
L.PRICE 0.827*** 0.788*** 0.831*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0533) (0.0464) 
IPPS 0.0148 0.0128 0.0196 
 (0.0320) (0.0272) (0.0293) 
REG 0.0319 0.0253 0.0194 
 (0.0352) (0.0330) (0.0328) 
UNB 0.0546 0.0555 0.0556 
 (0.0439) (0.0390) (0.0405) 
TAR -0.00951 -0.0104 -0.00684 
 (0.0381) (0.0363) (0.0367) 
OPREG -0.0671 -0.0763 -0.0705 
 (0.0780) (0.0764) (0.0766) 
DPVT -0.0747 -0.0257 -0.0570 
 (0.0682) (0.0588) (0.0598) 
PCGDP 0.0000108++ 0.0000114* 0.0000106++ 
 (0.00000660) (0.00000566) (0.00000563) 
N 321 321 321 
Standard errors in parentheses;  ++ p < 0.10 * * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Average Industrial Price of Electricity 
 As discussed earlier, the average price is a difficult variable with which to unravel the 
impacts of deregulation. Thus, it was deemed necessary to examine the same hypothesis for 
the average industrial price, in order to discern an impact. Again, a dynamic panel 
specification is used; the dependent variable is industrial price. 
  itiititit XINPRICELINPRICE εηβγ +++= −1.             --------------- (5) 
The results are presented in Table 4.5, and results are significant for most variables. The 
Arellano-Bond estimation shows no second order correlation, and the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions for both estimations indicates that the estimations are not robust, but 
not weakened by too many instruments. However, the presence of second order 
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autocorrelation is detected for the Blundell-Bond estimator, and thus the results from the same 
might not be accurate. They are however, broadly in line with the other two models. 
 
The coefficients on L.INPRICE are positive and significant across all three estimations. REG 
shows a positive, significant coefficient across all three estimations (but at the 10% level for 
Blundell Bond), implying that the establishment of a regulator increases industrial prices. In 
developing countries, true levels of price distortions tend to be revealed during initial reform. 
REG precedes restructuring, and thus the impact on prices might not be immediate. TAR 
shows a negative, significant coefficient across all estimations, in line with theorised impacts, 
namely, that the passing of tariff orders leads to lower industrial prices, as this measure is 
aimed at rationalising prices. OPREG shows a negative coefficient, significant at 10% for two 
out of three estimations. This is an expected result; OPREG indicates the presence of Open 
Access to the grid, and is meant to facilitate competitiveness in supply, especially for 
industrial consumers. Thus, it should lead to lower industrial prices. Finally, PCGDP shows a 
positive and significant coefficient for two out of three estimations; this can be interpreted as 
richer states having higher demand, and thus relatively higher industrial prices, although these 
might still be competitive. In this case PCGDP is mainly an indicator of demand-driven 
influence on the industrial price. 
 
Table 4.5: The Price Impacts of Deregulation II: Industrial Price of Electricity- 
Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Industrial Price (Rs. per unit) 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 INPRICE INPRICE INPRICE 
L.INPRICE 0.554*** 0.513*** 0.606*** 
 (0.0800) (0.0675) (0.0612) 
IPPS 0.0984 0.0901 0.0982 
 (0.105) (0.0876) (0.0935) 
REG 0.199* 0.199* 0.161++ 
 (0.0867) (0.0901) (0.0927) 
UNB 0.0167 0.0310 0.0395 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.113) 
TAR -0.234* -0.222* -0.229* 
 (0.101) (0.0973) (0.100) 
OPREG -0.344 -0.354++ -0.317++ 
 (0.237) (0.190) (0.197) 
DPVT -0.00399 0.0336 -0.00508 
 (0.185) (0.159) (0.171) 
PCGDP 0.0000297 0.0000354* 0.0000303++ 
 (0.0000262) (0.0000177) (0.0000187) 
N 260 260 260 
Standard errors in parentheses; ++ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 depict fracpoly plots of the relationship between average price and the 
reform index, and industrial price and the reform index, respectively. The average price shows 
a stabilising trend, and the industrial price shows a declining trend, with every successive 
higher score. Several conclusions can be drawn here. As expected, the impact of reforms on 
average price is difficult to discern, as there are presumably many other factors, including 
non-economic ones, which influence their direction and magnitude. The results for H3.1 
support this view; the lag of electricity prices would, as explained earlier, account for the 
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influence of omitted variables, and the results show a positive significant coefficient for 
L.PRICE.  
Figure 4.5: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Average Electricity Price versus Reform 
Index 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Industrial Electricity Price versus Reform 
Index 
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Moreover, PCGDP shows the other significant (and positive) coefficient on electricity price, 
indicating that richer states demonstrate a substantial influence on prices. These results are 
consistent across all estimations. The impact of reforms on industrial prices is easier to 
establish, as carried out in H3.2. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis 
of H3.2 is that the impact on industrial prices seems to occur only with the implementation of 
the measures of reform that fall in the latter half of the reform sequence, such as TAR, 
OPREG and DPVT. This is again, demonstrated by the prediction plots for industrial 
electricity price. Thus, a halfway reform may proliferate a trend of increasing prices for 
industry. 
 
4.5 The Pricing Impacts of Reform 
In addition to price, it is important to explore the impact of electricity sector reforms 
on pricing to determine whether the price impacts on price are reflective of changes in relative 
prices. Moreover, the pricing mechanism in India is distinctive to other countries, and is 
influenced by state specific socio-political factors. In fact, one of the original aims of 
electricity reforms was to bring about a correction in distorted pricing practices for electricity, 
as the financial health of the sector is closely tied to this. Two sub-hypotheses are formulated 
and examined. The first models this impact using PRATIO1; the second utilises the same 
concept for the dependent variable PRATIO2. Data for both cover 19 states and 16 years 
(1990-2006). The latter is also meant to be an indicator of cross-subsidies in Indian states. 
The same regression techniques are used here as in H3.   
 
Ratio of Industrial to Domestic Prices 
The ratio of industrial to domestic prices is a conventional indicator of the 
effectiveness of a reform programme, especially in developed countries, before reforms, since 
industries tend to subsidise residential consumers in these countries. Thus, ideally, the ratio 
should come down with the implementation of reforms. In India, the extent of cross-
subsidisation by the industrial consumer segment to the domestic consumer segment is not as 
clearly defined or to the same extent as the cross-subsidy from industry to agriculture. The 
model specification, conceptually similar to H3, is defined in the following equation: 
itiititit XPRATIOLPRATIO εηβγ +++= −11.1 -------------- (6) 
itX β  represents a vector of coefficients and independent variables; these include the six 
measures of an electricity deregulation programme and a control variable, namely PCGDP. 
HYDRO1 is not used as a control; as its effect is embodied in the set of reform indicators. 
The results from all three LSDVC estimations are presented in Table 4.6. There is no first or 
second order autocorrelation, and the Sargan test statistic is insignificant in all cases, 
indicating that the model estimations do not use an inordinately large number of instruments.  
 
TAR shows a negative coefficient, significant at the 10% level for all estimations, implying 
that the implementation of a policy on regular tariff orders leads to a reduction in PRATIO1. 
This is expected, as tariff orders are aimed at bringing about corrections in pricing. PCGDP 
shows a negligible positive coefficient, significant at the 10% level only for the AH 
estimation. IPPS, REG and UNB show negative but insignificant coefficients across all 
estimations. OPREG shows a positive but insignificant coefficient, implying a marginal rise 
in PRATIO1. These results must be interpreted in the context of the extent of subsidy to the 
domestic consumers, and the party that bears this subsidy, which in the cases of many states, 
may not be industry, but the state government. Moreover, the extent of subsidy to the 
domestic segment is presumably far lesser than agriculture, and might be sustained at 
consistent levels over time, in comparison to cross-subsidies to agriculture, which tend to 
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swing between zero and flat rates, depending on the political situation. Thus, to reiterate, the 
effect on PRATIO1 might not be as relevant in the Indian context, as compared to PRATIO2.  
 
Table 4.6: The Pricing Impacts of Deregulation I: Ratio of Industrial to Domestic Prices-
Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Industrial to Domestic Price 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 PRICE PRICE PRICE 
L.PRATIO1 0.139++ 0.111++ 0.173* 
 (0.0729) (0.0702) (0.0702) 
IPPS -0.244 -0.241 -0.276 
 (0.237) (0.227) (0.265) 
REG -0.0160 -0.0100 -0.0489 
 (0.262) (0.251) (0.279) 
UNB -0.128 -0.107 -0.108 
 (0.270) (0.262) (0.298) 
TAR -0.496++ -0.473++ -0.459++ 
 (0.256) (0.248) (0.279) 
OPREG 0.0926 0.101 0.135 
 (0.521) (0.504) (0.569) 
DPVT -0.0999 -0.157 -0.0975 
 (0.618) (0.602) (0.697) 
PCGDP 0.0000368++ 0.0000416 0.0000298 
 (0.0000555) (0.0000533) (0.0000625) 
N 258 258 258 
Standard errors in parentheses;  ++ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Ratio of Industrial to Agricultural Prices 
This sub-hypothesis attempts to determine the impact of reforms on cross-subsidies 
that flow from industry to agriculture. Ideally, the ratio should decrease with the 
implementation of reforms. This is an important part of reform, as it leads to several knock-on 
effects; the reduction of subsidies leads to corrections in pricing, and places a marginal value 
on electricity for agriculturalists, curbing wastages by the latter. It also has a bearing on the 
financial health of the sector, and is linked with commercial and technical loss reduction. The 
model specification is as follows: 
itiititit XPRATIOLPRATIO εηβγ +++= 2.2 ----------------- (7) 
itX β  represents a vector of coefficients and independent variables; these include the six main 
measures of an electricity deregulation programme, and PCGDP as a control variable,; iη  is 
the individual effect; and, itε  represents the error term. The results are presented in Table 4.7. 
The Arellano-Bond estimation shows second order autocorrelation, making its results 
questionable. However, the Blundell-Bond estimation reports a Sargan test statistic that is ‘not 
robust, yet not weakened by too many instruments’, making its results valid, along with the 
Andersen-Hsiao estimation. As expected, L.PRATIO2 shows a positive significant coefficient 
for all estimations. UNB shows a negative and significant coefficient for all three estimations, 
indicating a reduction in PRATIO2. UNB leads to the separation of the competitive segments 
in the sector, namely, generation and distribution, from its monopoly segment, transmission. 
Moreover, distribution is usually undertaken by companies that serve specifically allotted 
areas of the state. Thus, an element of transparency is immediately injected into the operations 
of the distribution sector. This separation would presumably make it easier for distribution 
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companies to recover their dues from their area-specific consumers. Further, UNB is usually 
undertaken alongside corporate practices, and this would expectedly lead to a reduction in 
hidden costs and wastage. Referring back to H3.2, it was established that UNB alone does not 
reduce industrial prices. Thus, it can be concluded that UNB reduces cross-subsidies, but not 
to an extent that is enough to have an effect on industrial price per se. OPREG shows a large, 
positive and significant coefficient across all estimations, indicating that it increases 
PRATIO2. OPREG implies that industrial consumers can purchase electricity from a third 
party, and that industrial users can produce own electricity at captive plants, and use the grid 
to wheel it to their production facilities. State governments could lose considerable business, 
and hence the revenue of state-owned companies would fall; this would have an impact on the 
cost of electricity to agriculturalists that are subsidised by industry. Thus, industrial 
consumers who choose OPREG are subjected to a cross-subsidy surcharge, to make up for 
this revenue loss, and to avoid cutting off subsidies to agriculture completely.  
 
Table 4.7: The Pricing Impacts of Deregulation II: Ratio of Industrial to Agricultural Prices-
Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Industrial to Agricultural Price 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 PRICE PRICE PRICE 
L.PRATIO2 0.299*** 0.309*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0704) (0.0699) (0.0683) 
IPPS 2.476 2.000 1.845 
 (5.035) (4.763) (5.133) 
REG 3.996 3.743 3.244 
 (5.105) (4.783) (5.005) 
UNB -16.24* -15.04* -16.03* 
 (7.594) (7.131) (7.496) 
TAR -4.756 -4.801 -4.874 
 (5.996) (5.571) (5.952) 
OPREG 25.24* 25.13* 25.89* 
 (10.47) (9.759) (10.25) 
DPVT 17.07 15.67 17.67++ 
 (12.31) (11.33) (11.96) 
PCGDP -0.000808 -0.000705 -0.000822 
 (0.00100) (0.000938) (0.00105) 
N 246 246 246 
Standard errors in parentheses; ++ p < 0.10* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
OPREG might therefore lead to an increase in PRATIO2, as the cost of electricity remains 
high for industrial consumers that opt for it. In practice, OPREG might work more effectively 
if there is sufficient competition in distribution to neutralise the effect of the cross subsidy 
surcharge. DPVT shows a positive coefficient significant at 10% for the Blundell-Bond 
estimation. As distribution privatisation has been undertaken only in two states (Orissa and 
Delhi) out of which the success of the first has been questioned, too little time may have 
lapsed to arrive at a conclusive result for the impact of DPVT on PRATIO2. Figures 4.7 and 
4.8 depict fracpoly plots of the relationship between average price and the reform index, and 
industrial price and the reform index, respectively. Both plots show a clear decline of price 
ratios with the implementation of successive measures towards the completion of a 
programme. Some overall conclusions can be drawn from the results of H4; the main one 
being that the impact on pricing is seen as distinctive from the impact on prices; price ratios 
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have more of a distributional character. What appear to be major changes in the pricing 
mechanism may not reflect in the final prices of electricity for end-consumers.  
Figure 4.7: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Ratio of Industrial to Domestic Price of 
Electricity versus Reform Index 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Ratio of Industrial to Agricultural Price of 
Electricity versus Reform Index 
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However, changes in prices have knock-on effects within the electricity sector itself, in terms 
of its commercial and technical viability. The impact on PRATIO1 is not as great in 
magnitude and direction as the impact on PRATIO2. Nor is it seen to contain too many 
underlying influences; it is directly influenced via measures implemented through tariff 
orders. Changes in this ratio seem to have remained consistent over time. PRATIO2, on the 
other hand, is open to several underlying influences; however, measures such as open access 
to the grid and distribution privatisation may only influence this ratio in the presence of 
sufficient competition, as these measures could drive up the cross subsidy, if implemented in 
isolation. Thus, PRATIO2 is highly sensitive to reform measures.  
 
4.6. The (Re) investment Impact of Reform 
This hypothesis aims to establish whether deregulation has led to improvements in 
network quality, and supply to end consumers. It is assumed that efficiency improvements 
may have a visible high-end impact on parameters representing network quality. The 
dependent variable used is the percentage shortfall in meeting total energy (electricity) 
demand or PWDF; this is different from the peak energy deficit, to which the current crisis in 
the sector is attributed. Reductions in PWDF are associated with distinct economic benefits; it 
could have potential positive impacts on the management of the peak energy deficit, thereby 
impacting quality of service. The data used cover 17 states and 14 years (1991-2004). A 
dynamic specification is used. The model used is Bias-Corrected Least Squares Dummy 
Variables (LSDVC) estimation, using all three options for initialising the bias correction. The 
equation representing the model specification is: 
itiititit XPWDFLPWDF εηβγ +++= −1. ----------------- (8) 
itX β  represents a vector of coefficients and independent variables; these include the six 
reform indicators, and control variables. The price ratios are included amongst the latter as 
price is administered through direct measures (tariff orders) and can also be considered an 
influence on reform. The main assumption of the LSDVC model is exogeneity of the 
regressors. The reform indicators (dummy variables) used here all conform to this; the price 
ratios represent changes in the underlying growth rate of variables, rather than the variable 
itself, and hence can be considered exogenous to the other regressors. The results from the 
estimations are presented in Table 4.8.  
 
The data available for exploring this hypothesis with PWDF is extremely limited; as a result, 
although the coefficients are computed for all variables, standard errors are not computable 
for around half of the independent variables. These have most likely been lost in the 
transformation process, due to insufficient information, or too many gaps45 in the dataset. 
Significant variables here are UNB and TAR, which show negative coefficients across all 
estimations, implying that these measures contribute to mitigating the energy shortages in 
states. UNB leads to the operational and management separation of generation, transmission, 
and distribution; this leads to the adoption of better corporate practices and oversight on 
technical parameters, as opposed to those in a state-owned monolith. Distribution entities are 
also assigned specific regions for service. Hence, logically speaking this would contribute to 
better load management, overall, and impact on the energy availability in a state. TAR leads 
to the passing of tariff orders aimed at rationalising prices of electricity amongst the different 
consumer segment. Prior to the passing of tariff orders, most states have had highly distorted 
pricing, involving large cross subsidies, and in some cases, free electricity to farmers.  
                                                 
45 STATA drops records with missing variables. 
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Table 4.8: The Reinvestment Impacts of Deregulation: Total Energy Deficit Estimation 
using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models; Dependent Variable: Energy Deficit (%) 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 PWDF PWDF PWDF 
L.PWDF -0.121 -0.133 -0.0744 
 (0.241) (0.227) (0.226) 
IPPS -1.466 -1.494 -1.475 
 (15.33) (15.55) (13.58) 
REG -4.667 -4.660 -4.545 
 (9.619) (9.745) (8.556) 
UNB -2.368*** -2.395*** -2.221*** 
 (0.163) (0.167) (0.152) 
TAR -2.282*** -2.276*** -2.148*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00291) (0.00240) 
OPREG 1.234 1.209 1.267 
 . . . 
DPVT -10.78 -10.75 -10.58 
 . . . 
PRATIO1 -2.686 -2.652 -2.791 
 . . . 
PRATIO2 -0.00192 -0.00218 -0.000911 
 . . . 
PCGDP -0.000606 -0.000616 -0.000617 
 . . . 
N 161 161 161 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Figure 4.9: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Total Energy Deficit versus Reform Index46 
 
                                                 
46 Examination of the graph shows that some data points indicate that the amount of unserved energy is negative. 
This could be attributed to a data anomaly. Future work could take this into account through the implementation 
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TAR would put a marginal value on electricity, thus curbing wastage, as the consumption 
patterns of the agricultural sector would adapt accordingly. Figure 4.9 depicts the fractional 
polynomial prediction plot of the relationship between PWDF and the reform index47. These 
show a decline in the total percentage energy shortage as one moves up along the index. Some 
limited conclusions can be drawn from this hypothesis. Electricity reforms appear to have a 
strong impact on mitigating the total energy deficit in states; however, this result must be 
interpreted in light of the fact that there is a chronic energy shortage across all Indian states, 
and thus the real concern here is management of supply, which has thus far failed to keep up 
with rising demand. Addition to generation capacity is important for addressing this.  
 
4.7 Impact of Reform on Industrial Consumption 
Industrial consumption is indicative of the response of industry to reforms, and thus 
can be considered a proxy of increased production and also of investment in new or existing 
production facilities within states. Changes in industrial consumption are also reflective of the 
cumulative impact of reforms. This hypothesis is examined separately for two dependent 
variables; INDCON and INDCONPC. The data used cover 19 states and 16 years (1990-
2006). The same technique is used, as in H3 and H4. The equation representing the model 
specification for the first regression takes the following form: 
 
itiititit XINDCONLINDCON εηβγ +++= −1.  ------------------- (9) 
itX β  is a vector of coefficients and independent variables - these include the six reform 
indicators and control variables. The latter include PRATIO1, PRATIO2 and PCGDP. 
HYDRO1 is not used here, as again, its effect is embodied in the reform measures; moreover, 
a set of regressions were attempted using HYDRO1, but failed to yield results. The results 
from the LSDVC estimations are presented in Table 4.9. There was no second order 
autocorrelation in the Arellano-Bond or Blundell-Bond estimations. The Sargan test statistic 
showed that the models are ‘not robust, but not weakened by too many instruments’.  
 
L.INDCON shows a positive and significant coefficient. In practice, industry would tend to 
proliferate in states where it has a sizeable presence, due to an established business 
environment. Hence, past levels of industrial consumption, being an indicator of industry 
presence, would determine current levels. IPPS show a large, negative and significant 
coefficient across all estimations (at 10% for the AH estimation), implying that industrial 
consumption is adversely affected by IPPS. This is expected, as IPPs in India have historically 
had contractual problems with state governments that purchase and distribute their product; 
they often carry; all of the above have resulted in IPPs’ electricity being sold at higher than 
economical rates to consumers. OPREG shows a large, positive and significant (at 10%) 
coefficient across all estimations, indicating a large increase in industrial consumption. Open 
access facilitates greater consumer choice for industrial users, and usually complements a 
liberal policy on captive generation, where industrialists can produce electricity with minimal 
bureaucratic procedure. This measure has, as expected, led to an increase in industrial 
consumption as it eases the operating environment for industry. Contrary to expected results, 
DPVT shows a negative, significant coefficient across all estimations, implying that it leads to 
reduced industrial consumption. In the Indian context, privatisation has taken place in Orissa 
and Delhi, of which the Orissa privatisation consisted of the sale of companies to private 
                                                                                                                                                        
of regression techniques using a truncated dependent variable, where the latter cannot take on a value less than 
zero. 
47 Summing up across all the reform indicators, each state receives a total score out of six; the construction of the 
index is clearly explained in the section on Data and Variables.  
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players without any restructuring involved. Thus, the outcomes have been mixed. The Delhi 
privatisation was carried out on the basis of a competitive bid and mandatory annual loss 
reduction targets for the private operators, thus, it has been deemed a success relative to the 
Orissa experience. However, this success may be attributable to management reform as much 
as to ownership change, and the former has been achieved, to an extent, without privatisation, 
in other states (e.g. Andhra Pradesh). Thus, insufficient experience has been gained in India, 
to draw a conclusion from this result, in comparison to other measures of competition. 
PRATIO1 and PRATIO2 show negative and significant coefficients across all estimations, 
implying that industrial consumption varies inversely with the level of cross-subsidy from 
industry to other consumers. This is an expected result.   
 
Table 4.9: The Investment/Consumption Impacts of Deregulation I: Total Industrial 
Consumption- Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Industrial Consumption (MKWh) 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 INDCON INDCON INDCON 
L.INDCON 0.992*** 0.988*** 0.983*** 
 (0.0602) (0.0439) (0.0351) 
IPPS -308.6++ -336.4* -333.0* 
 (165.8) (157.6) (157.0) 
REG -167.6 -164.5 -128.3 
 (196.5) (184.6) (187.7) 
UNB 49.65 53.92 95.65 
 (237.0) (227.8) (224.9) 
TAR -104.3 -11.03 -77.07 
 (205.7) (200.0) (198.7) 
OPREG 603.7++ 663.3++ 570.5++ 
 (414.1) (392.5) (389.1) 
DPVT -344.0*** -439.3*** -311.0*** 
 (52.52) (49.80) (48.76) 
PRATIO1 -21.27*** -21.39*** -37.29*** 
 (2.965) (2.925) (2.863) 
PRATIO2 -4.546*** -4.496*** -4.807*** 
 (0.0447) (0.0424) (0.0390) 
PCGDP 0.0780 0.0739 0.0776 
N 244 244 244 
Standard errors in parentheses; ++ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
The equation representing the model specification for the second regression takes the 
following form, with INDCONPC as the dependent variable: 
 
           itiititit XINDCONPCLINDCONPC εηβγ +++= −1.  -------------------------- (10) 
 
The results from all three LSDVC estimations are presented in Table 4.10. Test results 
conformed to the properties of the LSDVC estimators. L.INDCONPC shows a positive and 
significant coefficient for all estimations, implying that INDCONPC is dependent to an extent 
on past values of itself. Again, IPPS show a negative coefficient, significant at 10%, for all 
estimations. The same justification as in the case of INDCON, would apply here. TAR shows 
a significant (at 10%) coefficient for two out of three estimations, and is also negative, 
implying that it reduces industrial consumption. This is counterintuitive, as clearer rules on 
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
32 
 
tariffs should ideally attract more consumers. A possible explanation might be found in 
whether the tariff orders are multi-year or annual. Field interviews conducted with industrial 
consumers in the process of research revealed that industries had a strong preference for 
multi-year tariff orders, as there was greater scope for long-term planning of production and 
associated costs, in this case. In conformity with the results for INDCON, OPREG shows a 
positive and significant coefficient across all estimations. 
Table 4.10: The Investment/Consumption Impacts of Deregulation I: Industrial Consumption 
per Capita- Estimation using Bias-Corrected LSDV Models 
Dependent Variable: Per Capita Industrial Consumption 
 Model One Model Two Model Three 
 Anderson-Hsiao Arellano-Bond Blundell-Bond 
 INDCONPC INDCONPC INDCONPC 
L.INDCONPC 0.920*** 1.047*** 1.027*** 
 (0.0722) (0.0354) (0.0315) 
IPPS -8.564++ -7.528++ -6.858++ 
 (5.542) (4.258) (4.416) 
REG 1.371 -0.0974 0.572 
 (6.198) (4.882) (5.166) 
UNB 2.142 4.538 4.068 
 (7.626) (5.989) (6.201) 
TAR -6.777 -8.530++ -8.161++ 
 (6.498) (5.229) (5.500) 
OPREG 3.995 4.627 4.385 
 (12.67) (10.64) (11.06) 
DPVT -7.176*** 2.375++ -0.291 
 (1.659) (1.347) (1.383) 
PRATIO1 -1.213*** -1.218*** -1.374*** 
 (0.0952) (0.0756) (0.0786) 
PRATIO2 -0.0850*** -0.0898*** -0.0875*** 
 (0.00141) (0.00110) (0.00108) 
PCGDP 0.00350 0.00243 0.00221 
N 244 244 244 
Standard errors in parentheses; ++ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
DPVT shows mixed results; a negative significant coefficient for the Andersen-Hsiao 
estimation, and positive significant (at 10%) for the Arellano-Bond estimation, implying the 
possibility of an increase in per capita industrial consumption with distribution privatisation. 
This could refer to an improvement in the distribution of electricity consumption amongst 
existing industrial consumers in a state; state-owned companies traditionally charged higher 
prices for industrial consumers, thus possibly leading to lower consumption among certain 
sections of industrial consumers. DPVT enables the removal of cross-subsidies, and improves 
the spread of existing consumption within the industrial segment, facilitating greater access. 
PRATIO1 and PRATIO2 show negative and significant coefficients, showing that cross-
subsidies discourage industrial consumption. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 depict fracpoly plots of 
the relationship between average electricity price and the reform index, and industrial 
electricity price and the reform index. INDCON shows a slowly rising trend with the 
implementation of successive reform measures, whereas INDCONPC does not appear to be 
affected to the same extent, by reforms. Figure 4.12 is interesting, as it depicts a possibly 
lower amount of per capita consumption for states at the upper end of the reform spectrum. 
This could make sense, especially if these ‘reformer’ states have implemented measures 
liberalising the production and distribution of electricity in ways that exclude grid-provided 
power and encourage the purchase and wheeling of electricity from captive consortia.  
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Figure 4.10: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Industrial Consumption of Electricity 
versus Reform Index 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Fractional Polynomial Prediction Plot: Per Capita Industrial Consumption of 
Electricity versus Reform Index 
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5. Conclusion 
  
The Indian experience is unique, as the impacts hypothesised are manifested through 
unconventional pathways, conditioned by the political economy of electricity reform. 
Moreover, expected impacts differ from those experienced in developed and developing 
countries, and vary with the extent of reform, as well as with each reform measure. The main 
results are summed up as follows; this analysis demonstrates that reformed electricity 
infrastructure has the potential for contributing substantially to output measured in absolute 
terms, alongside other infrastructure. Within electricity, of the efficiency indicators, 
improvements have occurred most visibly in the levels of transmission and distribution losses 
in reformer states. With respect to Plant Load Factor, there seems to be an immediate 
improvement with the implementation of unbundling and tariff rationalisation. However, 
measures that go beyond these, such as open access, and distribution privatisation, are seen to 
have a negative impact on PLF. This may not necessarily be indicative of low efficiency and 
could reflect a period of readjustment of the system, following restructuring; thus, ‘efficiency’ 
with respect to the conventional idea of PLF would require a redefinition in relation to the 
more advanced measures of reform. Gross generation as an indicator of efficiency, or rather, 
investment, shows increases with the implementation of the latter half of reform measures, 
but has to be interpreted in the context of demand, and of chronic electricity deficits that exist 
in almost every Indian state. The behaviour of prices conforms somewhat to the impacts 
proposed. Notably, price rises are not arrested and prices do not decrease until the 
implementation of the latter half of a reform. Moreover, per capita GDP of states tends to 
push up price levels; this is indicative of higher demand in these states.  
 
An examination of states’ individual histories reveals that political economy can reverse any 
impact brought about by a reform programme48. Although reform has succeeded in reducing 
and completely arresting price increases for industrial consumers in several states, the chronic 
shortage faced in Indian states since 2005 has nevertheless inflated prices once again. This 
has partly occurred due to profiteering activities by northeastern states that are rich in coal 
resources, which produce and trade electricity to deficit states at a very high premium, 
negating the benefits of reforms. Changes in pricing, or in the mechanism of cross-subsidies, 
have also occurred with the implementation of reforms. Overwhelmingly, it is the 
implementation of a regular policy on tariff rationalisation that has had the most direct 
impact. The introduction of measures oriented towards market-driven or indirect outcomes, 
have so far not been as effective as direct measures49, suggesting that some corrections have 
to be forced into place before competitive factors come into play. With regards to sector 
reinvestment, establishment of an independent regulator, unbundling and tariff rationalisation 
may have had some positive impacts. This outcome must be interpreted in light of the fact 
that the federal government has parallel programmes operating to invest in distribution 
networks, and provides incentives for state governments to achieve certain preset targets. It 
was beyond the scope of this analysis to delve further into the untangling of these direct 
federal policy initiatives. Industrial consumption has shown a tendency to increase with the 
implementation of a complete reform. A fact that emerges here is that industries tend to prefer 
a connection to the state grid, when electricity from the grid is reliable and supplied at 
economical rates. 
                                                 
48 For instance, free electricity to farmers before state legislative elections mandated by states such as Andhra 
Pradesh, ordinarily considered a leading reformer, goes against any economic interpretations. 
49 The introduction of Open Access seems to increase cross-subsidies in some cases, as seen in the econometric 
results. This is due to a high penalty for industries that choose to take advantage of this measure and leave the 
state grid, thus resulting in a loss of revenue for the grid-supplying utility. 
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This analysis has empirically demonstrated that reformed electricity infrastructure has the 
potential to contribute to economic output in absolute terms; following from this, electricity 
reforms are found to be associated with visible changes in key economic variables related to 
the electricity sector. The results of this empirical analysis indicate that once begun, if left 
half-way, this impact could quickly turn negative. Substantial changes in economic variables 
begin to occur only once a baseline level of reform has been undertaken; in the Reform Index 
used in this analysis, this would pertain to the measures undertaken beyond 3 (out of 6), or 
beyond structural reform measures.  
 
REFERENCES 
Bacon, R. (1995). "Privatisation and Reform in the Global Electricity Supply Industry." 
Annual Review of Energy & the Environment 20: 119-143. 
Bacon, R. W. and J. Besant-Jones (2002). "Global Electric Power Reform, 
 Privatization and Liberalisation of the Electric Power Industry in Developing 
 Countries." Annual Reviews Energy & The Environment 26: 331-359. 
Besant-Jones, J. (2006). Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We  
Learned? Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper No. 19. Washington  
D.C., The World Bank Group. 
Bruno, G. S. F. (2005). "Estimation and inference in dynamic unbalanced panel data models  
with a small number of individuals." CESPRI Working Paper 165. 
Calderon, C. and L. Serven (2003). The Effects of Infrastructure Development on  Growth and  
 Income Distribution. Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No 270 
Chattopadhyay, P. (2004). "Cross Subsidy in Electricity Tariffs: Evidence from India." 
Energy Policy 32: 673-684. 
Cubbin, J. and J. Stern. (2005). "Regulatory Effectiveness and the Empirical Impact of  
 Variations in Regulatory Governance." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper  
 3535. 
Demurger, S. (2001). "Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth: An Explanation of 
Regional Disparities in China?" Journal of Comparative Economics 29: 95-117. 
Domah, P. D. and M. G. Pollitt (2001). "The Restructuring and Privatisation of the 
 Regional Electricity Companies in England and Wales: A Social Cost Benefit 
 Analysis." Fiscal Studies 22(1): 107-146.  
Dossani, R. (2004). "Reorganisation of the Power Distribution Sector in India." Energy Policy 
 32: 1277-1289. 
Dubash, N. (2003). "Revisiting Electricity Reform: The Case for a Sustainable Development 
Approach." Utilities Policy 11: 143-154. 
Dubash, N. and S. Rajan (2002). India: Electricity Reform Under Political Constraints. Power 
Politics: Equity & Environment in Electricity Reform. Washington DC, World 
Resources Institute. 
Ennis, H. M. and S. M. Pinto (2002). Privatization and Income Distribution in Argentina. 
Center for global Development Conference on Privatisation and Income Distribution. 
Esfahani, H. S. and M. T. Ramirez (2003). "Institutions, Infrastructure and Economic 
Growth." Journal of Development Economics 70: 443-477. 
Estache, A. (2004). Emerging Infrastructure Policy Issues in Developing Countries: A  
 Survey of the Recent Economic Literature. Background Paper for the POVNET  
Infrastructure Working Group, Berlin, The World Bank. 
Ferguson, F., Hill, R., Wilkinson, W (2000). "Electricity use and economic development." 
Energy Policy 28: 923-934. 
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
36 
 
Fink, C., Mattoo, A., Rathindran, R., (2002). "An Assessment of Telecommunications 
 Reform in Developing Countries." World Bank Policy Research Working  Paper 2909. 
Galal, A., Jones, L., Tandon, P., Vogelsang, I. (1994). Welfare Consequences of Selling 
Public Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis. New York, Oxford University Press. 
Ghosh, S. (2002). "Energy Consumption and Economic Growth in India." EnergyPolicy 30:  
 25-139. 
Gray, P. (2001). Private Participation in Infrastructure: A Review of the Evidence, The World  
 Bank, Private Advisory Group. 
Hamilton, J. (2003). “Are main lines and mobile phones substitutes or complements? 
 Evidence from Africa.” Telecommunications Policy 27: pp109-133 
Harris, C. (2003). Private Participation in Infrastructure in Developing Countries – 
 Trends, Impacts and Policy Lessons. World Bank Working Paper No. 5. 
 Washington DC, The World Bank/ The International Bank for Reconstruction and  
 Development. 
Hattori, T. and M. Tsutsui ( 2004). "Economic impact of regulatory reforms in the electricity 
supply industry: a panel data analysis for OECD countries." Energy Policy 32: 823-
832. 
Jamasb, T. (2006). "Between the State and the Market: Electricity Sector Reform in 
Developing Countries." Utilities Policy 14(1): 14-30 
Jamasb, T., Mota, R., Newbery, D., Pollitt, M. (2004). Electricity Sector Reform in 
 Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and 
 Performance. CMI Working Paper 47. Cambridge, The Cambridge-MIT  
 Institute. 
Jamison, M., Berg, S., Gasmi, F., Tavara, J. (2004). The regulation of utility 
 infrastructure and services: an annotated reading list. Washington D.C., The 
 World Bank. 
Judson, R. A. and A. L. Owen (1999). "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for 
macroeconomists." Economics Letters 65: 9-15. 
Kalirajan, K., Rao, M., Shand, R.(1998). The Economics of Electricity Supply in India. New 
Delhi, Macmillan India Limited. 
Kennedy, P. (2008). A Guide to Econometrics. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing 
Kikeri, S. and J. Nellis (2004). "An Assessment of Privatization." The World Bank 
 Research  Observer 19(1): 87-119. 
Laffont, J. (2005). Regulation and Development: Federico Caffe Lectures. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom, Cambridge University Press. 
Littlechild, S. (1999). Privatization and competition in the British electricity industry, with 
implications for developing countries. Energy after the financial crises: energy and 
development report 1999. E. McCarthy and F. Martin. Washington, D.C, World Bank. 
pp.41-46. 
Mota, R. (2003). The Restructuring and Privatisation of Electricity Distribution and 
 Supply Business in Brazil: A Social Cost-Benefit Analysis. DAE Working 
 Paper No. 309. Cambridge, Department of Applied Economics; University of 
 Cambridge. 
Nagayama, H. (2007). "Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on  
electricity prices in developing countries." Energy Policy 35(6): 3440-3462. 
Newbery, D. (1999). Privatisation, Restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press. 
Newbery, D.M. (1995) ‘A Template for Power Reform’, Private Sector, September, 9-12.  
 (World Bank). 
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
37 
 
Pollitt, M. (2004). Electricity reform in Chile - lessons for developing countries. CMI 
 Working Paper 51. Cambridge, The Cambridge-MIT Institute. 
Purfield, C. (2006). Mind the Gap—Is Economic Growth in India Leaving Some States 
Behind? IMF Working Paper: Asia and Pacific Department, IMF. 
Roller, L.-H. and L. Waverman (2001). "Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic 
Development: A Simultaneous Equations Approach." The American Economic 
Review 91(4): 909-923. 
Steiner, F. (2001). "Industry structure and performance in the electricity supply industry."  
 OECD Economics Studies 32(I). 
Toba, N. (2004). "Welfare Impacts of Electricity Generation Sector in the Philippines." CMI 
Working Paper Series: DAE Working Paper 0316. 
Tongia, R. (2003). The Political Economy of Indian Power Sector Reforms. Working Paper  
No.4, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford University. 
Vagliasindi, M. (2004). "The role of investment and regulatory reforms in the 
 development of infrastructure across transition economies " Utilities Policy 12: 303- 
 314. 
Vickerman, R. (2004). "Maintenance incentives under different infrastructure regimes." 
Utilities Policy 12: 315-322. 
Vickers, J. and G. Yarrow (1991). "Economic Perspectives on Privatisation." Journal of  
 Economic. Perspectives 5: 111-132. 
Victor, D.; Heller, T.C. (2007). The Political Economy of Power Sector Reform: The  
 Experiences of Five Major Developing Countries. 
Victor, D. (2004). Electricity Market Reform in Developing Countries: Results from a Five-
Country Study. Conference on State Level Electricity Reforms in India. New Delhi. 
Weinmann, J. and D. Bunn (2005). Resource Endowment and Electricity Sector 
Reform, London Business School Working Paper. 
Zhang, Y. F., Parker, D., Kirkpatrick, C.(2002). Electricity Sector Reform in Developing 
Countries: an Econometric Assessment of the Effects of Privatisation, Competition 
and Regulation. Working Paper No. 31; Centre on Regulation and Competition. 
Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of 
Manchester. 
NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION 
38 
 
APPENDIX I: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75 IQR 
INDGDP1 288 130964.00 118124.80 7005.75 624921.50 41960.02 93259.70 184624.30 142664.30 
INDPC 152 3834.868 2903.11 244.00 15418.00 1568.00 3384.50 5057.50 3489.50 
ELEC 284 279998.80 215633.90 7256.00 1005599.00 83161.50 190417.50 475596.00 392434.50 
RDS1 266 2216.50 1416.45 72.00 6438.00 988.00 2168.00 2976.00 1988.00 
RAIL 266 3481.30 2681.42 69.00 8944.00 1050.00 2981.00 5312.00 4262.00 
TEL 160 16.82 11.57 -24.98 42.14 8.23 19.79 25.13 16.90 
INTER1 229 1.38E+09 1.38E+09 500664.00 5.23E+09 1.97E+08 9.42E+08 2.47E+09 2.27E+09 
INTER2 265 8.17E+08 8.86E+08 1724175.00 4.13E+09 1.27E+08 4.31E+08 1.37E+09 1.24E+09 
IPPS 304 0.42 0.49 0 1 0 0 1 1 
REG 304 0.38 0.49 0 1 0 0 1 1 
UNB 304 0.19 0.39 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TAR 322 0.31 0.46 0 1 0 0 1 1 
OPREG 304 0.07 0.25 0 1 0 0 0 0 
DPVT 304 0.05 0.22 0 1 0 0 0 0 
REFINDEX 304 23.58 26.91 0.00 100.00 0.00 16.67 50.00 50.00 
PRATIO1 266 2.18 1.09 0.00 16.09 1.69 2.07 2.45 0.76 
PRATIO2 256 13.61 24.15 0.00 202.50 3.48 6.00 12.30 8.82 
POPN 290 4.82E+07 3.66E+07 1163800.00 1.79E+08 2.09E+07 4.53E+07 6.84E+07 4.75E+07 
PLF 266 48.20 26.99 0.00 90.60 24.84 53.95 69.10 44.26 
TDL 270 28.30 10.33 11.01 57.09 19.81 25.32 35.08 15.27 
GRGEN 290 48.15 36.64 1.16 178.83 20.90 45.30 68.43 47.53 
INPRICE 282 1.95 0.65 0.00 3.71 1.54 2.02 2.43 0.89 
PRICE 340 1.28 0.32 0.69 2.44 1.06 1.27 1.45 0.39 
INDCON 255 5832.90 4426.08 512.26 22680.34 2436.65 5101.05 7392.26 4955.61 
INDCONPC 255 125.72 72.91 8.84 347.70 80.26 104.97 179.51 99.25 
PWDF 203 10.31 11.03 -49.6 50.00 2.90 9.00 15.80 12.90 
HYDRO1 270 39.19 30.82 0.00 100.00 9.14 38.75 58.02 48.88 
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Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P50 P75 IQR 
PCGDP 290 10995.50 5196.22 2470.00 34205.00 7591.13 9646.00 13620.00 6028.87 
CSINDEX 238 9.00 4.91 1 17 5.00 9.00 13 8 
TSINDEX 238 7.50 4.04 1 14 4.00 7.50 11 7 
STATEID 412 10.57 5.80 1 20 6.00 11.00 16.00 10.00 
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Appendix II: Test Results 
Test Results for H1.1 (Industrial GDP) 
TEST Ho RESULT H1.1 
(Interaction) 
RESULT H1.1 
(No Interaction) 
Likelihood-Ratio Test 
for Heteroscedasticity 
Assumption: Nested in 
Hetero 
LR chi2 (17) = 373.68 LR chi2 (17) = 372.83 
Prob>chi2 = 0.000 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Wooldridge Test for 
Autocorrelation in 
Panel Data 
No 1st order 
autocorrelation 
Prob = 0.0066 Prob = 0.0041 
F (1,17) = 9.571 F (1,17) = 10.988 
Durbin-Watson  1.2692579 1.2635494 
Baltagi-Wu LBI  1.6165918 1.6143799 
 
Test Results for H1.2 (Industrial GDP Per Capita) 
TEST Ho RESULT 
(Interaction) 
RESULT 
(No Interaction) 
Likelihood-Ratio Test 
for Heteroscedasticity 
Assumption: Nested in 
Hetero 
LR chi2 (17) = 81.70 LR chi2 (17) = 69.98 
Prob>chi2 = 0.000 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
Wooldridge Test for 
Autocorrelation in 
Panel Data 
No 1st order 
autocorrelation 
Prob = 0.0423 Prob = 0.0355 
F (1,17) =5.826 F (1,17) = 6.383 
Durbin-Watson  1.2028159 1.1257152 
Baltagi-Wu LBI  1.4802919 1.4198106 
 
Test Results for H3 (Prices) 
Estimator Test Ho Result H3.1 Result H3.2 
Arellano Bond 1st order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -7.49 
Prob>z = 0.000 
z = -8.82 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 2nd order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = 0.13 
Prob>z = 0.8948 
z = 1.91 
Prob>z = 0.0557 
 Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(52)=200.27 
Prob>chi2=0.0053 
chi2(90)=113.82 
Prob>chi2=0.0457 
Blundell Bond AB Test for AR 
(1) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -5.06 
Prob>z = 0.000 
z = -5.40 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 AB Test for AR 
(2) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.04 
Prob>z = 0.969 
z = 2.31 
Prob>z = 0.021 
 Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(168)=220.63 
Prob>chi2=0.004 
chi2(103)=131.20 
Prob>chi2=0.032 
 
Test Results for H4 (Pricing) 
Estimator Test Ho Result H4.1 Result H4.2 
Arellano Bond 1st order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.46 
Prob>z = 0.6473 
z = -9.97 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 2nd order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.40 
Prob>z = 0.6899 
z = 2.34 
Prob>z = 0.0192 
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(H4 contd.) Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(52)= 50.47 
Prob>chi2= 0.9998 
chi2(52)= 173.33 
Prob>chi2= 0.000 
Blundell Bond AB Test for AR 
(1) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -1.34 
Prob>z = 0.181 
chi2(168)=170.42 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
 AB Test for AR 
(2) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.06 
Prob>z = 0.952 
 
 Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(168)=116.90 
Prob>chi2=0.165 
 
 
Test Results for H5 (Reinvestment) 
Estimator Test Ho Result 
Arellano Bond 1st order 
autocorrelation 
No autocorrelation z = -1.61 
Prob>z = 0.1063 
 2nd order 
autocorrelation 
No autocorrelation z = -0.00 
Prob>z = 0.9964 
 Sargan Test of Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(52)= 73.35 
Prob>chi2= 0.0843 
Blundell Bond AB Test for AR (1) in 
First Differences 
No autocorrelation z = -3.77 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 AB Test for AR (2) in 
First Differences 
No autocorrelation z = -0.45 
Prob>z = 0.655 
 Sargan Test of Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(168)=121.49 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
 
Test Results for H6 (Industrial Consumption) 
Estimator Test Ho Result (INDCON) Result 
(INDCONPC) 
Arellano Bond 1st order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -5.32 
Prob>z = 0.000 
z = -5.69 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 2nd order 
autocorrelation 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.55 
Prob>z = 0.5837 
z = 0.70 
Prob>z = 0.4845 
 Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(52)= 186.12 
Prob>chi2= 0.000 
chi2(52)= 181.30 
Prob>chi2= 0.000 
Blundell Bond AB Test for AR 
(1) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -5.63 
Prob>z = 0.000 
z = -6.14 
Prob>z = 0.000 
 AB Test for AR 
(2) in First 
Differences 
No 
autocorrelation 
z = -0.75 
Prob>z = 0.455 
z = 0.69 
Prob>z = 0.491 
 Sargan Test of 
Overid. 
Restrictions 
 chi2(168)=211.02 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
chi2(168)=219.77 
Prob>chi2=0.000 
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Appendix III: Status of Reform across Indian States 
 STATE IPPS REG UNB TAR OPREG DPVT TOT 
1 Andhra Pradesh 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
2 Arunachal Pradesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 Assam 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
4 Bihar 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
5 Chattisgarh 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
6 Delhi 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
7 Goa 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
8 Gujarat 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
9 Haryana 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
10 Himachal Pradesh 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
11 Jammu & Kashmir 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
12 Jharkhand 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
13 Karnataka 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
14 Kerala 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
15 Madhya Pradesh 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
16 Maharashtra 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
17 Manipur 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
18 Meghalaya 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
19 Mizoram 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
20 Nagaland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
21 Orissa 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
22 Punjab 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
23 Rajasthan 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
24 Sikkim 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
25 Tamil Nadu 1 1 0 1 1 0 4 
26 Tripura 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
27 Uttar Pradesh 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 
28 Uttaranchal 1 1 1 1 1 0 5 
29 West Bengal 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
 TOT 18 27 12 20 19 2  
Note: This is the latest available data from the Ministry of Power, Government of India, dated 
12/2007; it thus represents the time series used in the econometric analysis. 
